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Aberrant Salience and Probabilistic Reasoning in Distressing Attenuated Positive Psychotic 
Symptoms: An Examination of a Two Factor Model 
By Huw Green 
Advisor: Deidre Anglin 
Theoretical psychological models of positive psychotic symptoms have increasingly 
emphasized the interaction of multiple cognitive factors. Research into delusions in particular 
has focused on the interaction of two factors; a perceptual anomaly that gives rise to a need for 
explanation, and a bias toward premature acceptance of a hypothesis. Recently this two factor 
approach has been applied to positive psychotic symptoms more broadly. Two candidate factors 
have received extensive theoretical and empirical interest. The aberrant salience hypothesis 
posits that salience regulation, mediated by dopamine, goes awry in psychosis, giving rise to a 
generalized sense of undue significance that is applied to neutral perceptual stimuli. For the 
person who experiences it, this unwarranted sense of significance seems to demand an 
explanation. A second candidate factor, the jumping to conclusions bias has come to be regarded 
as one of the most stable findings in psychosis research. Reliably associated with the presence of 
delusions, but also associated with positive symptoms more broadly, the bias is seen when 
psychotic participants make a probabilistic decision on the basis of less evidence than controls. 
These factors may work in concert to establish unrealistic conclusions about the nature of 
perceptual inputs, giving rise to psychotic explanations. In a quasi-experimental study, 
individuals who endorsed an unusually high level of distressing attenuated positive psychotic 
symptoms (DAPPS) were compared with controls who endorse a lower than average number. 
Participants completed one behavioral and one self-report measure of aberrant salience, and a 
commonly used task for assessing the presence of bias in probabilistic reasoning.  
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Results: Preliminary analyses revealed that participants in the current study did not 
respond in the expected way to the behavioral measure of aberrant salience. It is possible that the 
task used is insufficiently sensitive to detect subtle variations in salience processing among non-
clinical individuals. In terms of the main results, multiple independent samples t-tests (corrected 
for multiple comparisons) revealed a group difference only on the self-report measure of aberrant 
salience. Groups showed no significant difference on the test of probabilistic reasoning, though 
the group with elevated rates of DAPPS requested more evidence than controls. Logistic 
regression models predicting group membership from the experimental variables suggested that 
while the inclusion of aberrant salience significantly improved predictive accuracy, neither 
probabilistic reasoning nor the interaction between aberrant salience and probabilistic reasoning 
increased predictive accuracy. This result is a consistent with an interpretation on which 
distressing attenuated positive psychotic symptoms are associated with aberrant salience 
attribution but not with probabilistic reasoning deficits. Further research is needed to establish 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: 
Psychotic disorders, during which people lose the capacity to distinguish their subjective 
experiences from shared reality and experience symptoms including hallucinations, delusional 
beliefs and disorganized thought, are potentially devastating and poorly understood1. Often 
starting in late adolescence/early adulthood, they affect around 1% of the population, though this 
figure has proved to be more variable across time and place than was conventionally believed 
(Stilo and Murray, 2010). One approach to the investigation of psychosis that is increasingly 
gaining traction is the study of the cognitive “pathways” that contribute to potentially distressing 
psychological end state “positive symptoms” such as hearing voices or holding delusional beliefs 
(e.g. McCarthy Jones, 2012; Freeman and Garety, 2014).  
An attendant assumption of this literature is that there is no clear “cut-off” between 
psychosis and “health”. Rather it is supposed that psychotic experiences lie on a continuum and 
can be considered to some extent analogous with experiences that have been found among 
healthy individuals (Meehl, 1962; Van Os et al. 2009). It is an implication of this assumption that 
the study of individuals without a psychiatric diagnosis, but demonstrating elevated rates of 
psychotic symptoms or “complaints” (Bentall et al., 1988), can inform our understanding of 
“full-blown” psychotic states. Individuals exhibiting “at risk” mental states represent a 
particularly promising population to study from this perspective (Fusar-Poli et al., 2013a).  
The study of “at risk” states arose from the hope that early intervention could arrest the 
development of psychosis and forestall its worst effects (McGlashan and Johannessen, 1996). A 
                                                            
1  The American Psychiatric Association defines psychotic disorders as follows: “They are defined by 
abnormalities in one or more of the following five domains: delusions, hallucinations, disorganized 
thinking (speech), grossly disorganized or abnormal motor behavior (including catatonia), and 




number of structured interview protocols (e.g. McGlashan et al., 2009) and self-report 
questionnaires (e.g. Loewy et al., 2005) have been developed to assess for such states, and these 
can predict conversion to a DSM/ICD psychotic disorder in around 32% of untreated cases after 
three years (Fusar-Poli et al., 2013b)2. In addition to the benefits of identifying people early in a 
posited neurodevelopmental process, the construct of an “at risk” state offers the possibility of 
studying the psychological processes involved in psychosis, with greater confidence than that 
offered by the study of “normal” samples differentiated by psychometric “proneness” measures 
like the Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999) or the Launay Slade Hallucination 
Scale (LSHS; Launay and Slade, 1981).  
Unlike “at risk” diagnoses, which identify individuals who are more likely to develop 
psychotic disorders (and who are frequently treatment seeking and experiencing significantly 
lower levels of social functioning and quality of life, Fusar-Poli et al. 2015), measures of 
proneness typically measure the prevalence of attenuated symptomatology in the healthy 
population with no reference to how much interference or dysfunction the symptoms cause to the 
individual who experiences them. Proneness is a broader category and tends to be defined in 
reference to the characteristics of any given sample. Thus a fairly typical research design 
examining psychosis proneness may administer the PDI or the LSHS to a sample of non-
treatment-seeking individuals and then divide these into a prone and non-prone group on the 
basis of a split into the upper and lower quartile. Otherwise, researchers may use responses on a 
self-report measure to generate a continuous outcome variable. A difficulty with this approach is 
that psychosis proneness is a hypothetical variable which cannot necessarily be considered to be 
                                                            
2 Though Fusar-Poli et al. (2013b) also note that the rates of conversion appear to have declined over time in 
successive longitudinal studies, from a two year rate of around 45% in a 2004 study, to two year rate of around 10% 
in a 2011 study. Although these studies do not compare treated and untreated groups, Fusar-Poli et al. suggest that 
the change may be due to a greater availability of preventative interventions during the last decade.  
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linked to clinically relevant psychotic symptoms. David (2010) addresses this and suggests it is 
premature to assume that high scorers on, e.g. the PDI are on the same continuum as those who 
experience clinically relevant psychosis. For this reason, the current study adopts an approach in 
which participants are administered a self-report measure sensitive to both the presence of 
attenuated positive psychotic symptoms and to the clinical “at risk” state. 
In the next section I will introduce contemporary psychological approaches to psychosis. 
A broad consensus of psychological researchers proposes that complex psychotic symptoms such 
as delusional beliefs and hallucinations are best understood in terms of multiple factors (e.g. 
Freeman, 2007). In an account of delusions offered by Coltheart et al. (2011), two factors in 
particular, an anomalous perceptual experience and a faulty reasoning style, are accorded 
significance. This two factor approach has recently been theoretically extended to a model 
designed to account for all positive psychotic experiences, not just delusions (Moritz et al., 
2016). Specific candidate “factors” have been increasingly researched, and I will introduce two 
of these, “aberrant salience” and the “jumping to conclusions” bias (JTC), along with the 
growing empirical literature on their role in psychotic symptomatology. However, while the 
empirical literature on these phenomena has grown, the majority of studies have treated them as 
individual factors, and focused on ascertaining their presence in schizophrenia and other 
psychotic disorders.  
I will go on to outline ways that aberrant salience and the JTC bias might interact to 
contribute to the early development of psychotic symptoms, suggesting that the two factor model 
supports the hypothesis that neither candidate is sufficient for a full blown psychosis. In the 
subsequent section I will propose an experimental procedure to examine how these variables 
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may be interacting in a group of individuals presenting with attenuated positive psychotic 
symptoms (APPS).  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review: 
 
2.1 Continuum approaches to psychosis and high risk: 
Since the mid-1980s (Bentall et al, 1988; Bentall, 2004), researchers have increasingly 
advocated investigating cognitive models of risk for psychotic phenomena. This work has built 
on the growing consensuses that psychological phenomena may be significant in the causal 
pathways to psychotic experiences, and that there is no clear “cut off” between people who are 
psychotic and people who are not. Originating in theory and research about schizotypy (Meehl, 
1962), research has increasingly focused on psychotic traits in normal people (Claridge, 1990) in 
order to understand the mechanisms of specific psychotic symptoms. This work has focused on 
experiences which indicate attenuated versions of more serious symptoms like hallucinations 
(defined as the presence of a “perceptual response”, often auditory, in the absence of an 
appropriate external stimulus which could have caused it, Launay and Slade, 1981; McCarthy 
Jones et al. 2014) and delusions (defined as “false beliefs” which are not concordant with a 
person’s culture, and which are held in spite of contradictory beliefs of others and evidence to 
the contrary, Coltheart et al., 2011). Scales developed by Launay and Slade (The Launay Slade 
Hallucination Scale, LSHS, 1981) and by Peters et al. (The Peters Delusions Inventory, PDI, 
1999) assess for the presence (respectively) of “hallucination-like” and “delusion-like” 
experiences. Both scales assess for experiences which resemble psychotic symptoms. Thus the 
LSHS asks participants about intrusive thoughts and anomalous visual and auditory experiences 
across 10 items (i.e. “In the past, I have had the experience of hearing a person’s voice and then 
found that no one was there”). The PDI uses 40 items (or 21 in a briefer, recent version) 
developed from canonical accounts of delusions (i.e. Schneider’s “first rank symptoms”) and 
also assesses for frequency, conviction and degree of distress. The presence of symptoms is 
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taken to indicate a degree of “proneness” in healthy populations, though typically a “prone” 
group is defined not in terms of a standard “cut off” number of items, but in relation to the 
quantitative characteristics of the sample from which it is drawn (i.e. the upper quartile of scorers 
being selected). This assumption has widened the scope of research into mechanisms that 
underlie these symptoms by enabling researchers to examine risk factors and mechanisms in 
non-clinical samples (e.g. Barkus et al., 2007, Laroi et al., 2005, Gracie et al., 2007). However, 
such research rests on the assumption that there is a meaningful relationship between this form of 
“proneness” and the symptoms experienced in psychotic illness.  
The view that psychotic phenomena lie on a continuum, with clinically diagnosable 
illness only representing one extreme of a more widely distributed set of experiences, has gained 
moderate support. A meta-analytic review by Van Os et al. (2009) assessed the validity of a 
psychosis continuum by aggregating data from an international range of studies of psychotic 
experiences in general population samples. The review confirmed a number of predictions made 
by the continuum hypothesis, namely that the prevalence and incidence of psychotic experiences 
is much higher than that of psychotic illnesses; that such experiences are associated with the 
same etiological risk factors (and the same cognitive mechanisms) which have been linked to 
psychotic illnesses, and that the presence of such attenuated experiences raises the risk of an 
individual developing a full blown psychotic illness. This last finding has been particularly 
important in the emergence of a new approach to mental health care, identifying people 
manifesting “at risk states” for psychosis, who are regarded as especially vulnerable to 




However, the notion of a psychosis continuum has been challenged by David (2010) who 
suggests that advocates for the idea have overstated their case. Meanwhile, some have queried 
whether the existence of a continuum calls into question any meaningful cut off between ill and 
healthy altogether. In practice, a number of diagnostic conventions have arisen to help clinicians 
and researchers distinguish those “at risk” from those who have already “transitioned” to illness. 
Broadly the central component separating these groups is the presence of reality testing. 
Individuals can experience quite elaborate symptoms, but these remain “attenuated” for as long 
as they are able to attribute them to plausible causes (i.e. to their “eyes playing tricks” rather than 
the presence of someone or something which could not reasonably be there). This places the 
capacity for doubt at the center of the distinction between healthy and well, and results in a high 
degree of subjective judgment on the part of clinicians. 
The concept of “at risk” status for psychosis has emerged over the last 15-20 years, 
principally as researchers sought ways to identify populations at greater risk of transition to full 
psychotic illness, with the hope of offering preventative clinical intervention pre-emptively 
(McGlashan and Johannessen, 1996; Daneault et al. 2013). This effort has been particularly 
pronounced in the United States, with the NAPLS study (see, Addington et al. 2012 for an 
overview).  A wide range of measures and different criteria have been developed to assess 
whether individuals can be considered “at risk”, starting with the Perceptual Aberration scale 
developed by Chapman and Chapman (1987). Subsequent instruments have been created at 
multiple sites internationally, many of them involving the delivery of structured interviews by 
trained clinicians or researchers (Daneault et al. 2013). This multiplicity of measures has yielded 
different approaches to what constitutes “at risk” status, with some measures focusing on the 
presence “attenuated symptoms” (i.e. experiences which are taken to constitute less problematic 
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versions of psychotic symptoms, such as “overvalued beliefs” and perceptual anomalies), and 
others focusing on “basic symptoms” (i.e. disturbances of drive, affect or attention, Ruhrmann et 
al., 2010, which can be considered the first stages of a psychotic illness like schizophrenia). 
Proponents of the latter approach have argued that, in addition to “at risk” individuals having an 
elevated chance of receiving a diagnosis of a psychotic illness like schizophrenia, they should 
also be regarded as ill in their own right, and as eligible for psychiatric diagnosis and treatment 
(Ruhrmann et al., 2010). A meta analytic review of social functioning and measures of quality of 
life by Fusar Poli et al. (2015) found that “at risk” groups were rated as showing substantially 
lower levels of functioning than healthy groups (hedges g=-3.01), with a smaller difference 
between them and people with psychotic disorders (hedges g=0.34). This has led some (Tsuang 
et al., 2013; Fusar Poli et al., 2014) to advocate that an “attenuated psychosis syndrome” should 
be included in the next version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM). This syndrome would consist of symptoms very similar to those seen in psychosis, but in 
less severe form, and not accompanied by the same degree of conviction as a full psychotic 
illness3.  
The notion of an “attenuated psychosis syndrome” raises again the question of where the 
cut-off between “ill” and “healthy” should be thought to lie. The idea of a clear distinction has 
never been without controversy, and as Fusar-Poli et al.’s (2014, 2015) work, and that of the 
suggests, there is good reason for thinking that many of those currently excluded from the DSM 
are also experiencing some degree of clinically relevant impairment. However, others (e.g. 
                                                            
3 In fact an “attenuated psychosis syndrome” was included in the last version of the DSM, but only in the appendix 
“Conditions for Further Study”. It is defined as follows: “Attenuated psychotic symptoms, as defined in Criterion A, 
are psychosis-like but below the threshold for a full psychotic disorder. Compared with psychotic disorders, the 
symptoms are less severe and more transient, and insight is relatively maintained. A diagnosis of attenuated 
psychosis syndrome requires state psychopathology associated with functional impairment rather than long-standing 
trait pathology. The psychopathology has not progressed to full psychotic severity.  Attenuated psychosis syndrome 
is a disorder based on the manifest pathology and impaired function and distress” (APA, 2013, p.783) 
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Bentall, 2004) have argued that some of the individuals currently captured by psychotic 
diagnoses in the DSM might be best off not thought of as “ill”, but rather as manifesting a 
reasonably “normal” response to their experiences (see also Longden et al. 2012). Until this 
question is resolved, there is likely to continue to be debate about where any cut-off should be 
drawn. For now, many clinicians presumably follow the suggestion by Wakefield (1992) that 
“illness” or “disorder” is present when there is a biological or cognitive dysfunction present 
which causes some form of harm (distress or a decline in social functioning) to a person. For the 
purposes of the distinction between fully psychotic and just “at risk”, interview measures include 
a way of rating subjective degree of certainty with which beliefs are held or hallucinations 
accounted for (more on this below). Self-report measures ask participants about attenuated 
experiences and rule out individuals who would meet criteria for a psychotic disorder. 
The Prodromal Questionnaire (PQ), developed by Loewy et al. (2005) is a self-report 
scale for attenuated symptoms which was developed to provide an instrument briefer than 
structured clinical interviews, but more comprehensive than symptom-specific measures. It’s 92 
item version (a shorter, 16-item version has subsequently been developed, Ising et al., 2012) lists 
a range of attenuated symptoms which participants respond “true” or “false” to, depending on 
whether they have experienced them within the last month. Constructed by using items from the 
Structured Interview for Prodromal Symptoms (SIPS, Miller et al., 2002) and the Schizotypal 
Personality Questionnaire (SPQ, Raine, 1991), the PQ assesses prodromal status by providing a 
tally of the number of attenuated psychotic symptoms (i.e. “I have heard things other people 
couldn't hear like voices of people whispering or talking”; “I have thought that things I saw on 
the TV or read in the newspaper had a special meaning for me”) a person has experienced. The 
authors of the scale conducted a validity study, establishing a cut score of 8 or more endorsed 
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items for reliably diagnosing “at risk” status (Loewy et al., 2005), but the measure also provides 
the possibility of a continuous measure as it yields a count of symptoms and an assessment of 
whether they are felt to be distressing.  The PQ is rooted in an “attenuated symptom” approach 
as, although it does assess distress, it does not include clinician-based assessment of functional 
impairment.  
To a greater extent than research that has focused on the administration of psychometric 
measures of symptoms within “normal” populations, the study of high risk states entails the 
recruitment of populations of people regarded as meeting criteria for a clinically relevant 
syndrome. This gives research into high risk states greater face validity as a source of 
information about psychosis. At risk screening measures like the PQ offer the possibility of 
assessing the presence “attenuated positive psychotic symptoms” (APPS) and examining the risk 
factors and cognitive mechanisms which are associated with being more or less at risk of 
psychosis. The fact that around a third of people who meet criteria for high risk states will 
transition to full psychosis (Fusar-Poli et al. 2013a) makes this population potentially particularly 
informative to study relative to healthy populations in which the risk of developing psychosis is 
unknown.  
Ideally the criteria for being “at risk” would be narrowed down yet further, and Fusar-
Poli et al. (2013) identify five factors which elevate the risk of transition within “at risk” 
samples. These are: genetic risk (psychotic illness among 1st degree relatives) with an attendant 
functional decline, high unusual thought content decline, high suspicion/paranoia, low social 
functioning and history of substance abuse. More recently, the importance of social functioning 
in particular has been highlight by Fusar-Poli et al. 2015, who confirmed that lower functioning 
predicts transition to psychosis in a high risk group with a moderate effect size (g=0.43). Work 
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on automated speech analysis (Bedi et al. 2015) has also recently pointed to characteristics of 
speech as potentially diagnostic. Using a program which parsed the speech individuals at high 
risk for semantic coherence and syntactic structure, researchers were able to predict with 100% 
accuracy who would develop psychosis in the next two years. This result drew on a relatively 
small sample (34, of whom 5 transitioned to full psychosis), but it suggests that verbal behavior 
may have a particularly powerful role in distinguishing “at risk” who will become psychotic 
from those who won’t. However, while these diagnostic factors can be assessed by clinical and 
research protocols, the criteria for specifying “at risk” status have not, at present, been changed 
to integrate them. 
2.2 Psychological approaches to delusions as a route to understanding psychosis 
Delusions are considered a central component of psychosis, having been identified as one 
of nine “first rank symptoms” of schizophrenia by the German psychiatrist Kurt Schneider 
(Bentall, 2004) and subsequently incorporated into DSM definitions of schizophrenia in every 
edition since the introduction of formal criteria in DSM-III. Understanding how delusions arise 
can thus provide an important route to understanding psychosis more generally. The latest 
version of the DSM (APA, 2013) defines delusions relatively briefly as “fixed beliefs that are not 
amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence”. The manual then goes on to distinguish 
“Persecutory delusions” (the belief “that one is going to be harmed, harassed, and so forth by an 
individual, organization, or other group”); “Referential delusions” (the belief “that certain 
gestures, comments, environmental cues, and so forth are directed at oneself”); “Grandiose 
delusions” (an individual’s belief that “he or she has exceptional abilities, wealth, or fame”); 
“Erotomanic delusions” (an individual’s false belief “that another person is in love with him or 
her); Nihilistic delusions (“the conviction that a major catastrophe will occur”), and somatic 
delusions (“preoccupations regarding health and organ function”). 
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 However, there is considerable controversy about when a belief can be considered 
“delusional” as opposed to merely mistaken or unusual (David, 1999), and even whether the 
phenomena commonly labelled “delusions” ought to be considered as beliefs at all (e.g. 
Hamilton, 2007; Radden, 2010). DSM-5 explicitly acknowledges the first of these difficulties, 
saying that “the distinction between a delusion and a strongly held idea is sometimes difficult to 
make and depends in part on the degree of conviction with which the belief is held despite clear 
or reasonable contradictory evidence regarding its veracity” (APA, 2013, p.87). In practice, 
certain belief-like states of mind are taken by clinicians to be sufficiently distressing and 
ungrounded in evidence that they warrant clinical attention. Where an individual lacks insight or 
the capacity to entertain doubt about such a belief (i.e. a loss of “reality testing”) it is considered 
delusional (Arango and Carpenter, 2011).  Some authors (e.g. Cermolacce et al., 2010) have 
suggested assessing delusions not only in terms of their verbal content, but also in terms of the 
“conditions of intersubjective encounter” between the clinician and the patient. Whether or not 
delusions can be said to be beliefs (as opposed to attitudes, as suggested by Radden, 2010), they 
nonetheless have a distinctive cognitive structure (Gerrans, 2013), which it behooves clinical 
psychological researchers to understand.  
 Just as there is no entirely uncontroversial distinction between delusional and non-
delusional beliefs/attitudes, so there is no widely accepted distinction between fully psychotic 
delusions and attenuated/prodromal delusion-like states. Measures of attenuated symptoms like 
the PQ or the SIPS include items that resemble delusions, but which are more closely akin to 
“normal” experiences than the strong conviction entailed by the DSM criteria for a delusion (e.g. 
items 38 is “I have felt that other people were watching me or talking about me;” these 
experiences are taken to be prima facie less unusual than delusions, but similar in character). The 
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section of the SIPS which deals with positive symptoms (and thus includes experiences similar to 
delusions) refers to “overvalued ideas” rather than delusions, and one way in which the 
distinction between an attenuated symptom and a psychotic symptom is made is by reference to 
whether the individual is able to entertain doubt regarding the veracity of their belief 
(McGlashan et al., 2010).  
Much recent psychological research on delusions has built on the conclusion that the 
cognitive psychological aspects of this manifestation of psychosis may be substantially shared 
between people who manifest “full and frank” delusional symptomatology and people who 
display “at risk states” or “proneness” (Garety and Freeman, 2013). One theme that emerges 
from this research is that delusions are not merely epiphenomenal manifestations of an 
underlying brain disorder, but also have psychological characteristics, which may play a 
significant role in their etiology. One of these, the “jumping to conclusions bias”, has been 
widely investigated in clinical and non-clinical samples, and will be discussed below. No single 
overarching factor has been identified as the cause of delusions, rather multi-factorial models are 
proposed (Garety and Freeman, 2013).   
2.3 Multi-factor models 
In one early theoretical cognitive account of delusions, Maher (1974) suggested that 
unusual reasoning processes were less important to the formation of delusions than some form of 
“unusual and intense phenomenological experience”. Maher was responding to the suggestion 
that a delusional belief could only result from an “underlying disorder of thinking” such as 
“faulty syllogistic reasoning”, leading to the drawing of a false conclusion (a delusion). 
However, according to Maher, this sort of disorder of inferential process might not be necessary; 
an anomalous experience would be sufficient, on its own, to result in a delusion. Theorists have 
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subsequently argued that this sort of anomalous experience is necessary but not sufficient for the 
formation of delusional beliefs (McKay, 2012). Why this is the case will be explained in greater 
detail below. 
 Contemporary cognitive theorists (e.g. Bell et al., 2006; Freeman, 2007) propose that a 
theory of the formation of delusions must contain multiple factors, to account for the various 
aspects that go together to make up the complex presentation of a clinical delusion.  Each 
component of a delusion begs explanation; the nature of its content, the degree of conviction 
with which it is held and its immunity to being refuted. As Coltheart et al. (2011) point out, this 
multiplicity of components makes the explanatory task formidable. However, most models 
include at least two principal factors, and a subset of theorists have suggested that these may be 
sufficient to explain the core experience of delusions: how it comes to be that some people 
develop and hold highly unusual beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence. Here I focus on 
the two factor model proposed by Coltheart et al. (2011), who propose that in order to develop a 
delusional belief, two components may be sufficient; an “unusual perceptual phenomenon” 
(p.285), and “defective belief evaluation” (p.285). 
Coltheart et al.’s model is intended to explain what they term “monothematic” delusions, 
such as the Capgras delusion, where a person comes to believe that their family members have 
been replaced by identical imposters. A two factor account of Capgras delusion was outlined by 
Ellis and colleagues (Ellis et al., 1990) who posited that this experience could arise from a deficit 
in the cognitive-affective processes involved in face recognition. Ellis et al. (1997) demonstrated 
that patients with Capgras delusion demonstrated an attenuated autonomic response to familiar 
faces, suggesting that they did not emotionally distinguish between relatives and strangers, even 
though they could visually recognize them. Here the relevant “first factor” is moderately clearly 
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delineated (an absence of the autonomic arousal normally associated with recognizing a family 
member). However, as Coltheart et al. (2011) point out, it is insufficient on its own, as not all 
individuals who experience this emotional-recognition deficit will develop the delusion. A 
second factor is required, namely a faulty inductive reasoning process whereby the individual 
starts with an anomalous subjective experience and derives an unwarranted inference to account 
for it. In the Capgras delusion, the unwarranted inference is the contention that a relative is in 
fact an imposter. This two-factor model is supposed to be able to account for all monothematic 
delusions, and Coltheart et al. (2007) have suggested it is also relevant in the context of 
schizophrenia.   
In comprehensive review of the psychological mechanisms associated specifically with 
paranoia, Freeman (2007) suggests that anomalous experiences (of the sort which could play a 
role as a first factor) had been under-researched in this area. One reason for this may be that, 
while the Capgras delusion has been frequently associated with specific neurological damage 
(such as lesions to the right lateral prefrontal cortex, Coltheart, 2007), many delusional 
syndromes, such as schizophrenia and other related psychotic illnesses have been less 
consistently associated with a specific neurological abnormality, making it harder to identify a 
consistent cause of a relevant “first factor” across all cases. (Radden, 2010, draws out this 
difference further, making a distinction between monothematic “deficit delusions” such as those 
seen after strokes or traumatic brain injury, and “complex paranoid systems”, such as those seen 
in disorders like schizophrenia, Radden, 2010, p.27).  
Nonetheless, Coltheart et al. (2011) propose that their model may have relevance for 
psychotic illnesses like schizophrenia, and suggest two potential candidates for a first and a 
second factor in delusions, the first of which has started to gain attention from psychosis 
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researchers, and the second of which has been widely researched since the late 1980s. They 
suggest that one relevant candidate for a relevant “first factor” could be aberrant salience (Kapur, 
2003), a feeling of strange, undue significance, bestowed upon environmental phenomena which 
is posited to yield “unusual and intense” sensory experiences of the sort which demand some 
explanation. Meanwhile, a specific disorder of hasty inferential reasoning, a “Jumping-to-
conclusions bias (JTC) or “epistemological impulsiveness” (Bentall, 2004) may be a viable 
“second factor”, which leads people to draw a delusional inference to explain their anomalous 
experience. In the next sections I will review the existing evidence on these two posited “factors” 
and their prevalence in samples of people who exhibit them.  
A difficulty with this two factor account of delusional ideation is that while it would be 
consistent with liberal acceptance of a belief most people would reject (i.e. the “taking hold” of 
an implausible belief), it is also consistent with subsequent acceptance of a new belief with 
minimal new evidence (i.e. the rapid rejection of a delusion in favor of an alternative candidate 
belief). Clinical delusions are described as beliefs held with an incorrigible degree of conviction, 
so how could a two factor theory explain this? One possibility is that the two factors are not the 
whole picture. Thus it may be that they are necessary but not sufficient factors (in which case an 
extra factor is required to account for the incorrigibility). Alternatively, it might be that a 
reasoning bias toward “jumping to conclusions” does not entail a willingness to relinquish 
conclusions which have already been reached.  Fine et al. (2007) present some evidence which is 
consistent with this latter possibility, concluding that, although a tendency to “jump to 
conclusions” is reliably associated with delusional belief, a tendency to update beliefs in the face 
of contradictory evidence is not. Thus the presence of a jumping to conclusions bias does not 
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appear to entail a tendency to jump to new conclusions once an initial conclusion has been 
drawn. I will now discuss the two candidate factors in greater detail.  
2.3.1. Factor One: Aberrant Salience 
The aberrant salience framework was initially proposed by Kapur (2003), who suggested 
that the role of dopamine as a regulator of motivational salience (Berridge and Robinson, 1998, 
Berridge, 2007) could help to explain how a postulated dopamine dysregulation in psychosis 
could lead to the positive symptoms of this disorder. Salience refers to the way that an 
environmental stimulus is rendered appetitive or aversive rather than just a “cold bit of 
information” (Kapur, 2003, p.14). This process bestows a sense of significance on things we 
wish to acquire or avoid, allowing them to stand out for us against a background. However in 
psychosis the production of both stimulated and unstimulated phasic striatal dopamine is 
elevated (Abi-Dargham and Grace, 2011), and this may result in the attribution of “aberrant 
salience” (Kapur, 2003). By Kapur’s account, the extra sense of significance also entails a 
demand for a subjective explanation, and it is this element which can contribute to the formation 
of a delusion. 
Kapur suggests that this theoretical framework fits particularly well with the early stages 
of psychosis, as it is commensurate with phenomenological accounts given by people in the early 
stages of delusion formation, who describe a feeling of “heightened awareness” and a drive to 
“make sense” of the situation. Kapur’s account of aberrant salience in these terms is thus 
commensurate with the description of an “intense and unusual phenomenological experience” 
described by Coltheart et al. (2011). Investigators have deployed experimental (Roiser et al. 
2009) and self-report measures (Cicero et al.2010) in an attempt to assess aberrant salience in the 
context of psychosis. 




Kapur’s theory predicts that the way salience is assigned to objects will be different in 
individuals who demonstrated aberrant salience. This is described in terms of subjective changes 
in the experience of “significance” (Kapur, 2003), but given the putative centrality of “salience” 
to reward learning, it has also been possible to derive behavioral predictions about people’s 
responses to learning tasks. Roiser et al. (2009) developed an experimental measure to assess 
salience attribution behaviorally; The Salience Attribution Test (SAT: see detailed description 
below). The SAT is based on an implicit-learning procedure and requires participants to learn the 
financial contingencies associated with different visual stimuli. Reaction times provide 
behavioral measures of implicit aberrant and adaptive salience, and ratings on a Visual Analogue 
Scale provide explicit aberrant and adaptive salience.  
In this paradigm, the variables of greatest interest are implicit and explicit aberrant 
salience, both of which represent an effort to derive an index of the tendency to irrelevantly "tag" 
stimuli with salience, even when they are not rewarded (Kapur, 2003). Implicit aberrant salience 
is the tendency to show increased speeding to irrelevant trials, and explicit aberrant salience is 
the tendency to show evidence of a false-belief that they were more likely to be rewarded on 
these trials (see method section, below, for further details). The concept of adaptive salience 
arises from evidence suggesting that, under normal conditions, animals and humans will show a 
tendency to react more quickly (a “speeding” response) to stimuli that have come to be 
associated with a reward, and that this response is mediated by the mesolimbic dopamine system 
(Wyvell and Berridge, 2000; Roiser et al., 2009). This reasoning is rooted on the theory that 
dopamine's role in processing reward is grounded in regulating salience rather than the hedonic, 
pleasurable aspects of reward (Berridge, 2007).  
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 Roiser et al. (2009) found that when they administered this task to people with and 
without a diagnosis of schizophrenia, there was evidence of differential salience attribution 
between groups. Individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia showed lower levels of adaptive 
salience than controls, and when they conducted an analysis directly comparing those patients 
with delusional symptoms to patients without, delusions specifically were associated with 
aberrant salience. Roiser et al. (2013) administered the SAT to a group of 18 individuals who 
met the criteria for an “at risk mental state” as measured by the Comprehensive Assessment of 
At Risk Mental State (CAARMS) and to 18 healthy controls. They also undertook fMRI scans of 
the participants during the procedure. At risk individuals were more likely to attribute salience to 
task-irrelevant features (showing significantly greater explicit aberrant salience), and this 
tendency was associated with a greater intensity of delusional ideation as measured by the 
“thought content” subscale of the CAARMS.  
 The SAT has subsequently been linked directly to the functioning of the human striatal 
dopamine system. Nagy et al. (2012) administered the task to individuals newly diagnosed with 
Parkinson’s Disease (PD) and matched controls. Twelve weeks later the PD patient group had 
received a dopamine agonist (pramipexole or ropinirole) as part of treatment, and were 
administered the SAT a second time. Nagy et al. found that participants who had taken the 
dopaminergic drug showed an increase in aberrant and adaptive salience relative to the baseline 
measurement. Furthermore, the increase in aberrant salience (but not the increase in adaptive 
salience) was associated with self-reported anomalous subjective “psychotic-like” experiences as 
measured by the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason et al, 
1995). Nagy et al. took this to suggest that while dopaminergic medications may enhance 
adaptive salience (a stand in for “acuity and motivation, which are degraded by Parkinson’s 
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disease), they may also increase a tendency toward aberrant salience, and thereby elevate the risk 
of the psychotic symptoms, which are sometimes a side effect of these medications.  
 However, the behavioral results of Roiser et al. (2009) and (2013) were not replicated in 
a recent study (Smielskova et al. 2015), that used the SAT in an fMRI procedure. Smielskova 
and colleagues compared adaptive and aberrant salience across four groups: 34 individuals with 
a CAARMS defined “At Risk Mental State”, 29 individuals with a first episode psychosis 
(divided into 17 who were taking antipsychotic medication and 12 who were not), and 19 healthy 
controls. A multiple group comparison revealed no group differences on any of the SAT 
behavioral outcomes. The authors suggest this may result from high within-group variability 
seem in their sample, and point out that their control group showed higher levels of explicit 
aberrant salience than Roiser et al.’s (2009). They also raise the possibility of differences 
between their first episode sample and Roiser et al.’s schizophrenic sample, who had been on 
potentially salience-disrupting medication for longer. Another possibility is that these relatively 
small samples produce under-powered statistical results and are prone to producing idiosyncratic, 
non-replicable results. Smielskova et al. did find group differences in the fMRI component of 
their study, consistent with activation of specific regions of the “salience network” 
(Palaniyappan and Liddle, 2013). However, without corresponding behavioral findings, this 
result lacks clear explanatory power.  
 Studies which employ the Salience Attribution Test have included measures of 
potentially confounding neuropsychological factors, including measures of IQ, and processing 
speed (Roiser et al., 2009; 2013). One potentially confounding factor that has not been examined 
is the capacity to switch from one set of task demands to an alternative. The SAT demands that a 
person be able to respond more quickly in to one set of stimuli than to others. It purports to be 
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measuring the presence of disrupted salience processing (i.e. a tendency to attribute less visual 
significance to stimuli). However, an important alternative and as yet untested possibility is that 
a failure of speeding to “task-relevant” stimuli over task irrelevant stimuli represents a general 
deficit in the speed with which an individual is able to undertake task switching. In the present 
study this possibility was controlled for by the inclusion of the trail making task from the Delis-
Kaplan Executive Frontal System (Delis et al., 2001). It has been suggested that the trail making 
task measures speed and cognitive fluidity (Salthouse, 2011). If these motor factors are 
impacting performance on the SAT, a correlation would be expected between adaptive salience 
and TMT performance.  
2.3.3. Self Report Measure: The Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI): 
 Aberrant Salience has also been operationalized using self-report. The Aberrant Salience 
Inventory (ASI) is a pen and paper measure of Aberrant Salience (Cicero et al. 2010), which 
aims to assess for the presence of a heightening of various subjective phenomenological features 
associated with Kapur’s theory of aberrant salience.  
In the first study using the ASI, Cicero et al. (2010) conducted an exploratory factor 
analysis which suggested a five factor structure to aberrant salience, and confirmed the presence 
of a single higher order factor to which these were all related. The authors also assessed the 
convergence of their aberrant salience measure with other constructs considered to be related to 
psychosis (Eckbald & Chapman’s 1983, Magical Ideation Scale; Chapman et al’s 1978 
Perceptual Aberration Scale, and Lenzenweger et al.’s 1997 Referential Thinking Scale) 
confirming that while the ASI correlated with these and not with measures of social anhedonia. 
When a “psychosis proneness” group was defined using the same measures, this group scored 
more highly on the ASI than controls. Finally, when the measure was administered to a clinical 
sample (36 of whom had a history of psychotic disorders and 28 of whom did not), the patients 
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with psychotic disorders had a significantly higher mean score on the ASI (Cohen’s d= 0.57) 
than the non-psychotic psychiatric patients. A logistic regression analysis also suggested that the 
ASI successfully predicted to which group participants belonged.  
 Cicero et al. (2013) administered the ASI, alongside a measure of “Self-Concept 
Clarity” (SCC) (“the extent to which one’s beliefs about one’s attributes are clear, confidently 
held, internally consistent, stable, and cognitively accessible”, Stinson, Wood, & Doxey, 2008, p. 
1541, quoted by Cicero et al. 2013, p.34)  to three larger samples of people with high levels of 
“psychotic like experiences” (PLEs). They hypothesized that low SCC and high ASI should 
interact to predict elevated rates of PLEs (measured by adding together results on the Perceptual 
Aberration scale, Chapman et al. 1978 and the Magical Ideation Scale, Eckblad & Chapman, 
1983). They found that the relationship between ASI and PLEs was moderated by SCC, such that 
high ASI was only associated with PLEs under conditions of low SCC. A second study 
replicated this finding, and extended it by including a specific measure of delusional ideation and 
distress (The Peters’ Delusions Inventory, Peters et al. 2004). A third study incorporated a 
measure of neuroticism to rule out the possibility that the ASI/SCC interaction could be 
accounted for this variable. No three-way interaction was revealed by this analysis, and there was 
no two-way interaction between either ASI and neuroticism, or SCC and neuroticism in 
predicting PLEs. The results of Cicero et al.’s large sample studies suggest that aberrant salience 
may not be sufficient to produce PLEs, but could work in concert with other psychological 
characteristics. They do not link this explicitly to the two factor framework, but do suggest that 
the nature of the interaction between ASI and SCC may result from the way that low Self-
Concept Clarity impacts on the willingness an individual has to construct a psychotic explanation 
for an experience.  
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Cicero et al. (2015) extended this finding to 162 individuals screened using the Structured 
Interview for Prodromal Syndromes (SIPS), a more detailed interview measure of psychosis “at 
risk” state. In this study 162 undergraduate participants were divided into a “positive schizotypy” 
group (i.e., scoring high on measure of positive psychotic symptoms: n=53), a negative 
schizotypy group (i.e. scoring high on a measure of social anhedonia, a distinct component of 
schizotypy more akin to negative psychotic symptoms: n=64), and a comparison group of 45 
individuals who did not meet criteria for these groups. The authors replicated the pattern of their 
(2013), finding that SCC was negatively correlated with interview rated psychotic like 
experiences at high levels of ASI, and confirmed that this interaction was only true in the case of 
positive schizotypy, and not in relation to negative schizotypy. This is what would be predicted 
by aberrant salience theory, which gives salience dysregulation a role in positive symptoms, but 
not in negative symptoms (Cicero et al., 2015).  
2.3.4 Factor Two: The Jumping to Conclusions Bias 
Recent psychological models of psychosis have suggested that anomalous experiences 
alone are insufficient to account for psychosis (Bell et al., 2007; Coltheart et al., 2011), and that a 
second factor is required. This second factor is posited to be some deficit in reasoning ability (as 
opposed to the single factor model of Maher, 1974, who specifically argued that normal 
reasoning processes could lead to delusional beliefs), which differs systematically from normal 
reasoning. Human reasoning under conditions of uncertainty is known to be suboptimal across 
multiple domains among normal individuals and even “experts” (see Kahneman, 2011 for a 
review). This makes it complicated to define “healthy” and “pathological” reasoning, and Huq et 
al. (1988) even suggest that the reasoning process manifested by people with delusions could 
even be closer to being “optimal” (as defined by Bayesian estimates of probability) than people 
without. Nonetheless, a tendency to draw inferences in a way that systematically differs from 
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normal, and which gave rise to delusions, could be considered pathological in virtue of its role in 
causing psychotic symptomatology. One candidate which has been proposed is a systematic 
disposition to draw conclusions more quickly than non-delusional individuals, a tendency which 
Bentall (2004) describes as “epistemological impulsiveness” and which has come to be called the 
“jumping to conclusions bias” (Garety et al. 1991; Freeman and Garety, 2014).  
The use of a reasoning task to investigate a “jumping to conclusions bias” was introduced 
into the literature on psychosis by Huq et al. (1988) who compared the performance of 15 
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia and experiencing delusions, with 10 non-deluded 
patient controls, and 15 individuals with no psychiatric diagnosis on the “beads task”. In this 
version of the task, participants were presented with two jars. One jar contained 85 green beads 
and 15 pink beads; the other had the same proportions but the colors inverted (85 pink, 15 
green). Beads were then “drawn” from the jars as though at random and shown to participants in 
a sequence, which the researchers had actually predetermined. In the simplest condition of the 
task, participants were required to decide which jar they thought the beads were coming from, 
but could “draw” as many beads as they wished before they decided. Three other conditions were 
also included; requiring participants to rate the probability of a particular color being next 
(condition 2), rate the probability that a given bead came from a particular jar (condition 3), and 
a combination of both of these latter (condition 4). The dependent variable was the number of 
beads drawn before the jar was decided upon (“draws to decision”). The “deluded” group in this 
study showed an average of 1.22 “draws to decision”, while controls had an average of 2.60. 
This group difference was significant.  
This study introduced the notion of a specific deficit in the evaluation of evidence to form 
beliefs. Huq et al. (1988) concluded that delusions could be formulated as a failure of Bayesian 
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belief updating, with participants demonstrating insufficient caution before drawing a 
conclusion. The precise nature of the JTC bias remains somewhat controversial, with various 
accounts of whether the demonstrable difference between delusional and non-delusional 
individuals on the “beads task” is best considered to arise from a deficit in memory (i.e. a 
difficulty holding information about multiple beads in mind and so “giving up” more quickly), a 
greater “need for closure”, or even from a tendency to imbue each piece of information (i.e. each 
bead) with a greater sense of significance, and thereby reach a conclusion more quickly (Fine et 
al. 2007). Another important issue is whether performance on the beads task is indicative of an 
underlying bias in evidential reasoning (as proponents have claimed), or a result of the diverse 
range of cognitive deficits present in schizophrenia.  
Huq et al. (1988) did not check for the potential confound of behavioral impulsivity, 
though they did compare delusional subjects to psychiatric controls, to control for non-delusion 
specific cognitive deficits that may be associated with mental illness. Subsequent examinations 
of JTC and impulsivity have tended to suggest it does not account for performance on the beads 
task.  
Dudley et al. (1997) administered two versions of the beads task (the original 85:15 
version and a harder 60:40 version) to three groups: patients with delusions, patients with 
depression and healthy controls. They found that, although the delusions group still drew fewer 
beads than the other groups across conditions (replicating previous work), they also drew 
significantly more beads on the harder version (finding later replicated by Garety et al. 2013). 
Dudley et al. took this to suggest that the delusion group was demonstrating a data gathering bias 
rather than simply acting impulsively by responding after a set number of beads. This result 
speaks against the suggestion that impulsivity drives the JTC effect, but it does not rule out the 
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possibility; it may be that the extra difficulty of the 60:40 version counteracts some degree of 
impulsivity in individuals with delusions, but that this is still what drives the effect. More 
compellingly, Lunt et al. (2012) administered the beads task to a group of individuals with 
frontal lobe damage, a group with ADHD and a group of healthy controls. Although the frontal 
lobe damage group demonstrated a data gathering bias relative to the other two groups, the 
ADHD group did not differ from the healthy controls, a finding which Lunt et al. took to suggest 
that impulsivity is unrelated to the data gathering bias. Furthermore in a factor analysis which 
examined various social and neurocognitive tasks in psychosis, van Hooren et al. (2008) found 
performance on the beads task to be correlated only weakly with performance on the Trail 
Making Task (r=0.19), but not correlated with the Stroop test or semantic fluency. 
2.3.5. JTC in People with delusions 
Since Huq et al.’s initial study, the presence of a JTC bias in samples of people with 
delusions has been replicated multiple times and been subject to a number of reviews (e.g. 
Garety and Freeman, 1999; Freeman and Garety, 2014). The dependent variable in the task has 
increasingly been dichotomously defined in the terms of the presence or absence of a JTC-bias, 
defined by the selection of two beads or fewer before making a decision. In a systematic review 
of the literature on persecutory delusions Freeman (2007) suggested that the unusual robustness 
of the effect across 10 reviewed studies made the JTC bias a rare phenomenon in the context of 
psychosis research.  
Fine et al. (2007) conducted several meta-analyses to test competing explanations of the 
JTC bias, and determined that comparisons between schizophrenic groups with and without 
delusions suggest a reliable association with this positive symptom. This suggests that the bias 
cannot be accounted for simply in terms of being an “epiphenomenon” of the neurocognitive 
deficits (i.e. vigilance, sustained attention, Green, 2001) which are associated with 
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schizophrenia. Specifically, Fine et al. concluded that the 12 studies they analyzed supported the 
theory that a JTC bias is driven by a tendency to make a decision on the basis of less evidence, 
rather than a tendency to ignore disconfirmatory evidence. Studies which specifically examined 
the use of disconfirmatory evidence (i.e. sequencing beads so that they suggested one jar initially 
and then a different jar, making it rational to change one’s mind) found that delusional 
individuals expressed significantly greater uncertainty than non-delusional individuals under 
such circumstances. Thus, it is not that delusional individuals are more stubborn about their 
conclusions, but rather they are quicker to draw them. Fine and colleagues also tested the 
suggestion that, rather than being a causal factor in the generation of delusional beliefs, the JTC 
bias might be a result of general cognitive deficits associated with schizophrenia. They 
aggregated the results of studies which compared schizophrenia patients with and without 
delusions, and which examined the bias in a group with delusional disorder vs. psychiatric 
controls. These approaches control for the possibility that the bias might be an epiphenomenon 
of schizophrenia per se by ensuring that the difference between control and experimental groups 
is limited to the presence of delusions and does not also include broad cognitive deficits. If a JTC 
bias were an epiphenomenon of psychosis per se, this specific association with delusions would 
not be expected, hence Fine et al. rule out what they call the “strong epiphenomenon hypothesis” 
(“that the JTC effect is purely a consequence of schizophrenic symptomatology unrelated to the 
presence of delusions per se”). However, they were not able to rule out what they call the “weak 
epiphenomenon hypothesis”, that schizophrenic symptomatology makes a contribution to the 
presence of the JTC bias, because they found the effect to be stronger in deluded participants 
diagnosed with schizophrenia than in non-deluded, schizophrenia-diagnosed controls.  
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A recent meta-analysis (Malcolm-Ross et al. 2015) found slightly less encouraging 
results in terms of strength of the JTC bias in people with clinically significant delusions 
compared to healthy controls. These authors examined all studies in which the Jumping to 
conclusions bias had been used in samples which were also assessed with the Peters Delusions 
Inventory PDI; Peters et al., 1999). The authors found that the association between the bias 
(operationalized by a smaller number of “draws to decision”) and a high score on the PDI is 
robust but small (Cohen’s d = 0.03). The effect was most stable among the subgroup of studies 
that had examined it in non-clinical samples. When they took the subgroup of studies which had 
examined the bias in people with current delusions, the aggregated effect was not significant. 
This study has been the first to suggest that the association between the JTC bias and delusions is 
not as strong as has been thought. However, two important caveats should be noted about this 
result. First, Malcolm-Ross and colleagues suggest that their result could be due to the low 
statistical power of subgroup analysis. Second, by only examining studies which have deployed 
the PDI, Malcolm-Ross and colleagues exclude a number of studies such as Huq et al. (1988) 
and Garety et al. (1991) which first established the presence of the effect among delusion 
positive samples. A planned systematic review and meta-analysis of all JTC like tasks (Taylor et 
al. 2014) will better reveal the extent of any effect.  
2.3.6. JTC in at Risk States 
To date only one study has examined the jumping to conclusions bias in a sample of 
people clinically assessed as being “at risk” for psychosis, a group which may be critical for 
understanding how psychotic symptoms first emerge. Broome et al. (2007) administered three 
versions of the task (an “easy” one with an 85:15 ratio of beads; a harder version, with a 60:40 
ratio and a hardest version with three jars, with ratios of 44:28:28) to 35 individuals with an “at 
risk mental state” (ARMS) and 23 healthy controls. They found that draws to decision among the 
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ARMS averaged 8.5, compared to 13.4 in the controls on the 60:40 version of the task and 12.5 
compared to 17.5 on the 44:28:28 version. These differences were significant. However, unlike 
the majority of studies which have examined the phenomenon in people with full blown 
delusional states, they did not find a significant effect for the 85:15 version4. The authors suggest 
this may be due to the 60:40 version being harder, and therefore more sensitive to the presence of 
an attenuated version of the JTC bias in groups of people who have not developed full-blown 
symptoms. It may also be a result of the fact that Broome et al.’s experimental group was defined 
in terms of individuals meeting criteria for an “at risk mental state” and not in terms of the 
presence of delusion-like experiences per se (thus diluting the effect in an essentially 
heterogeneous group). Nonetheless this result points to the presence of a JTC bias in people who 
are at risk of developing psychosis, a finding which ought to be replicated in a larger sample. 
Furthermore, while Broome et al.’s study can be taken as tentative evidence for the presence of a 
reasoning deficit in people at risk of developing psychosis, it does not examine how this putative 
factor might interact with other factors to produce full-blown psychotic symptoms. Thus further 
research is required to confirm the presence of a JTC bias alongside attenuated psychotic 
symptoms, and to clarify what the role of this bias might be in concert with other factors that are 
postulated to contribute to psychosis.   
2.3.7. Sensitivity and the “beads task” 
Multiple versions of the beads task appear in the literature, with the most frequently 
varying element being the ratio of the differently colored beads. The original task used a ratio of 
85:15, though this is now commonly referred to as the “easy” version of the task, with a 60:40 
                                                            
4 The authors do not state whether the order of these tasks was counterbalanced. This raises the possibility of task-
sequencing effects such that performance on one of the “versions” of the task is systematically altered in virtue of 
having been preceded by practice on the other.  
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ratio regarded as a more difficult task. The results of Broome et al. (2007), who found a group 
difference between “at risk” individuals and controls on the hard version but not the easy, 
suggest that the “easy” 85:15 version of the Jumping to Conclusions task may be insufficiently 
sensitive to differences between two groups not actively experiencing delusions. This makes it 
important to include an easy version in the proposed study, which focuses on a sample that 
closely resembles Broome et al.’s.  
2.4. Aberrant Salience and Jumping to Conclusions as distinct “factors”: 
Cognition is known to be altered in psychosis, with numerous studies and multiple 
reviews confirming the presence of a range of deficits in populations with schizophrenia 
(Fioravanti et al., 2005; Fatouros-Bergman et al., 2014), and in individuals at clinical “high risk” 
(Bora et al., 2014). These deficits range across the domains of perception (Green et al., 2011); 
working memory (Lee & Park, 2005); attention and vigilance (Elvevåg et al., 2000) and 
executive function (Fioravanti et al., 2005).  
Whether aberrant salience and the JTC bias can be viewed as distinct constructs, and thus 
as good candidates for the “first” and “second” factors of Coltheart et al.’s (2011) model, 
depends on whether performance on tasks which set out to measure them can be shown not to 
result from such cognitive deficits. Furthermore, it is theoretically important to show that 
aberrant salience and the JTC bias themselves are distinct cognitive processes rather than merely 
epiphenomena of the same underlying process.  
In terms of the first question, the JTC bias has been examined in the context of several 
neurocognitive processes, with a strong suggestion that memory deficits play a role in the bias. 
Garety et al. (2013) performed the largest study of this nature, and found that the JTC bias is 
associated with poorer working memory, a finding which was also present in Broome et al. 
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(2007). Additionally, when Menon et al. (2006) performed a version of the beads task in which 
each drawn bead remained visible as a memory aid to the participant, no difference was found 
between deluded and non-deluded patients with schizophrenia. No other cognitive deficit has 
been reliably associated with the beads task, though the role of impulsivity has been examined 
(see above) and executive functioning (as measured by rule-extraction tasks) has been shown in 
one study to be associated with beads task performance (Garety et al., 2013).  
Aberrant Salience has been less widely assessed than the JTC bias. In theory this 
experience ought to be expected to arise not from a disrupted neurocognitive impairment, but 
from a disorder of neuromodulation (i.e. the “mood” which is bestowed on subjective 
experience, Kapur, 2003). However, the experimental assessment of aberrant salience (the SAT) 
draws on processes of memory, attention and inhibitory control, and so differences in 
performance between psychosis and non-psychosis groups are vulnerable to confounding by 
these cognitive factors. Schmidt and Roiser (2009) assessed the divergent validity of the SAT by 
administering it concurrently with measures of working memory, IQ, probabilistic reward 
learning, learned irrelevance and sensitivity to probability. They performed a factor analysis with 
variables from all these measures and discerned five distinct factors; “operant/explicit learning”, 
“general cognitive ability”, “cognitive speeding”, “implicit aberrant salience” and “attentional 
vigilance”. Schmidt and Roiser took the emergence of a distinct “implicit aberrant salience” 
factor to be particularly strong evidence of good construct validity, and also found that measures 
of working memory and IQ loaded onto separate factors from their outcome variables of interest 
from the SAT. In subsequent studies, Roiser and colleagues have administered the SAT and in 
one study found only explicit adaptive salience to be positively correlated with a proxy measure 
of IQ (the Weschler Adult Reading Test) and the forwards and backwards versions of the digit 
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span task (Roiser et al, 2009). In a second study, no such correlations were found, leading Roiser 
at al. (2013) to conclude, “elevated aberrant salience scores in UHR individuals were unlikely to 
be secondary to some general cognitive deficit” (p.1331).  
In terms of the second question, several lines of evidence tentatively suggest that the 
aberrant salience and the JTC bias can be viewed as distinct constructs: a. It has been shown that 
pharmacological treatments which impact on dopamine functioning (and thus should also impact 
on salience regulation) do not impact on the JTC bias. b. Studies which have examined the JTC 
bias in detail have not found evidence to suggest that the JTC bias is driven by dysregulated 
salience and c. Studies which have compared the JTC bias across multiple “levels” of delusional 
ideation.  
2.4.1. Pharmacological Studies  
The two components of psychosis described above have started to be examined together. 
Andreou et al. (2013) performed a randomized double blind trial in which 36 healthy participants 
(age 18-40) with no history of mental illness or treatment with psychotropic drugs were divided 
into three groups and administered L-DOPA (a promoter of dopamine synthesis), Haloperidol (a 
drug which blocks the impact of dopamine by occupying receptors) or a Placebo. Using a double 
dummy experimental design to ensure testing began at the maximum serum concentration for 
each drug, experimenters gave participants a version of the beads task (the fish in lakes version) 
and a procedure that tested their confidence for memories. There was no impact of dopamine 
related substance on draws to decision. However, participants administered Haloperidol showed 
significantly less overconfidence than either the L-DOPA or placebo groups on incorrect 
responses to the false memory task. The authors suggest that this could be due to the separation 
of two factors, aberrant salience and JTC-bias, and that it is plausible that these would interact to 
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give rise to delusional beliefs. Like Broome et al. (2007), the authors suggest that the 60: 40 
beads task is better than the 85:15 version for discriminating among healthy subjects.  
 There is evidence that antipsychotic treatment (which has been theoretically and 
experimentally linked to aberrant salience) does not reduce the JTC bias, suggesting that this 
component of delusional belief can be considered distinct, and potentially trait-like. Peters and 
Garety (2006), and So et al. (2012) conducted longitudinal studies in which the beads task was 
administered over multiple time points during a study of treatments. In these studies a JTC bias 
was found to be consistent, even while other measures of delusional intensity, and delusion 
related distress declined. This raises the possibility that antipsychotic medications act on a 
distinct “factor” in terms of their action on delusions Additionally, Menon et al. (2008) found 
that the presence of a JTC bias on an emotionally salient version of the task (in which individuals 
“draw” adjectives to form a conclusion about whether they describe the self or another person) 
moderates the effectiveness of antipsychotic treatment. Individuals who demonstrated the bias 
showed less improvement in positive symptoms over time. Menon et al. suggest that this result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the JTC bias represents a distinct risk factor for delusions. 
However, this result was not found in a neutral (beads) version of the task. Their use of an 
emotionally salient version of the task potentially blurs the boundary between a cognitive 
“reasoning” factor and an emotionally-salient factor. Menon et al. may be measuring something 
other than “jumping to conclusions” reasoning per se. That they did not break down their results 
into different types of positive symptom and still found a moderating relationship provides 




2.4.2. Detailed studies 
In their meta-analysis examining the details of the JTC bias in psychosis, Fine et al. 
(2007) considered the hypothesis that the JTC bias could be driven by emotional salience, i.e. 
that the tendency to make fewer “draws to decision” could result from each draw being imbued 
with heightened salience, and therefore feeling subjectively more important in determining 
which jar it came from. They found that studies which had made beads (or, more frequently the 
bead-equivalents in tasks which were superficially different, but structurally analogous to the 
beads task) more emotionally salient did not exacerbate the strength of the difference in JTC bias 
between delusional and non-delusional groups. They concluded that Kapur’s aberrant salience 
hypothesis could not explain the JTC bias, which presumably results from another psychological 
mechanism unrelated to salience regulation. This finding supports the view that aberrant salience 
and a JTC bias can be regarded as distinct factors.  
2.4.3. Testing JTC across different “levels” of delusions  
To date five studies have taken the approach of comparing the bias across more than two 
levels of delusion (typically two “healthy” groups scoring “high” and “low” on a measure of 
delusion proneness, and a clinical group with a diagnosis of a delusional disorder. Results have 
been mixed. Van Dael et al. (2006) compared four groups of increasing risk; 40 patients with 
schizophrenia diagnoses and delusions, 40 first-degree relatives, 41 “psychosis prone” 
individuals and 53 healthy controls. The researchers defined the JTC bias as drawing just one 
bead before making a decision. They observed a linear trend with increasing levels of psychosis 
risk associated with an increasing percentage of participants showing the bias. They concluded 
that there was a dose-response relationship between delusional intensity and level of JTC-bias. 
Balzan et al. (2012) found a similar stepped increase over three groups of increasing risk.  
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However, three studies have found results which support a different interpretation. Warmans 
et al. (2007); Freeman et al. (2010) and Ho Wai So and Kwok (2015) all stratified participants 
into three groups, and found that the JTC bias was less prevalent among the “middle” group 
(delusion prone) than among the healthy controls.  This pattern of results suggests that there may 
not be a straightforward linear relationship between increasing levels of delusional intensity and 
the jumping to conclusions bias. One potential explanation for this is that while the presence of a 
first factor may be sufficient to elevate a person’s “delusion proneness”, the presence of a second 
factor (i.e. a data-gathering bias) is required for the delusion to attain the full intensity required to 
cross over into clinical relevance. Under such circumstances we might expect “delusion-prone” 
individuals to manifest normal, or even enhanced inferential abilities. Such intact inferential 
capacity could act as protective; ensuring that people who are delusion prone in virtue of the 
presence of a first factor do not become fully delusional. This offers a potential hypothesis for 
the relationship between aberrant salience and JTC as interacting components of clinically 
significant delusions. If the absence of a second factor distinguishes clinical delusions from at 
risk states then we might expect to see a pattern where a candidate second factor (in this case 
JTC) moderates the relationship between a candidate first factor (in this case AS) such that an 
association between AS and clinically significant delusional ideation is present only when a JTC 
bias is also present.  
2.5. Predictions and Hypotheses 
The research and theory which has been reviewed here suggests that both aberrant 
salience and a “jumping to conclusions” bias may play a role in attenuated psychotic symptoms. 
These have never been investigated thoroughly in the context of the same study. Roiser et al. 
(2009) did include an “easy” 60:40 version of the beads task in their examination of the SAT, 
finding no association between experimentally assessed aberrant salience and a jumping to 
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conclusions bias. However, their study also failed to replicate the well-established JTC bias in 
schizophrenia patients relative to controls, so it could be that their small sample size lacked the 
power to detect such an effect. It thus remains unknown precisely in what manner aberrant 
salience and hasty decision-making might be expected to relate to psychotic symptomatology as 
distinctive “factors” in a multifactorial process.  
Previous research suggests that aberrant salience and the JTC bias are both associated 
with attenuated psychotic symptoms, with the JTC bias also associated more specifically with 
delusions (Garety et al., 2013), and with “delusional intensity” in an “at risk” group (Broome et 
al., 2007). Thus the simplest possible outcome of the present study is that these two variables 
make an independent contribution to psychotic symptoms, i.e. both aberrant salience and the JTC 
bias will be associated with a high level of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms, but aberrant 
salience and JTC will not be correlated with each other.  
However, the two factor theory would predict that aberrant salience and the JTC bias 
could interact with one another such that the contribution of aberrant salience will be necessary 
but not sufficient to generate attenuated psychotic symptoms. Thus the association between 
aberrant salience and attenuated psychotic symptoms would be expected to be stronger under 
conditions where the jumping to conclusions bias is also present than when it is not. The stability 
of performance on non-emotionally salient versions of the beads task, combined with its apparent 
immunity to antipsychotic treatment, suggests the possibility that the jumping to conclusions bias 
is a trait-like feature of reasoning in comparison to the more state like experience of aberrant 
salience, thought to be influenced by dynamic changes in neuromodulation.  




HYP 1: Individuals who display a high number of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms 
will demonstrate a high degree of aberrant salience and a “jumping to conclusions” bias 
relative to control participants who display a lower number of such symptoms. 
HYP 2: Individuals high in attenuated psychotic symptoms will show greater levels of 
aberrant salience, but this will be moderated by a “jumping to conclusions” style of 
reasoning, such that the positive association between high aberrant salience and attenuated 
psychotic symptoms will be stronger for individuals with high levels of JTC than 




Chapter 3: Method 
3.1. Overview 
 The present study was a quasi-experimental, between group procedure, comparing the 
performance of a “high PQ” group and a “low PQ” group (see below for definitions of these 
groups) on measures of aberrant salience and jumping to conclusions bias. To control for the 
possibility that behavioral measures of aberrant salience are confounded by a difficulty with 
cognitive fluidity and task switching, the Trail Making Task was also administered.  
3.2. Participants 
The Prodromal Questionnaire (PQ) had been administered to a large sample of 
undergraduates as part of an ongoing longitudinal study examining distressing attenuated 
positive psychotic symptoms (DAPPS) in the context of a range of social and demographic 
factors.  The PQ provides a continuous outcome variable (the absolute number of attenuated 
symptoms endorsed), but his sample can also be separated into two groups; one of “high” scoring 
and one of low scoring individuals on the PQ. Conventions have not been established for 
determining how to divide samples using this measure, but a sensitivity and specificity analysis 
performed by Loewy et al. (2005) suggested that endorsing 8 items or predicted at risk status 
with 90% sensitivity and 49% specificity. Thus the “high” scoring group in the current study was 
defined in terms of anyone endorsing 8 or more distressing positive symptom items. The “low” 
scoring group was defined in terms of anyone endorsing fewer items than the sample mean PQ-
items endorsed. 32 participants were recruited from the former group and 30 from the latter.  
3.3. Materials 
3.3.1. Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI) 
The Aberrant Salience inventory is a 29-item measure which assesses subjective 
experiences of aberrant salience attribution. Cicero et al. (2010) reported good overall internal 
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consistency for their scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89) and, in terms of construct validity, found 
positive correlations with other psychotic-like experiences scales; the Magical Ideation Scale 
(r=0.55), the Perceptual Aberration Scale (r=0.47), the Referential Thinking Scale (r=0.41). In 
contrast to these convergences, Cicero et al. found a relatively low correlation between their 
measure and the Social Anhedonia Scale (r=0.17) which they took to indicate that the ASI also 
demonstrated good divergent validity. Further construct validation was pursued by dividing 
participants into high and low groups on existing psychosis proneness measures (the Magical 
Ideation Scale or the Perceptual Aberration Scale) to determine whether membership of a 
psychosis proneness group, defined by high scoring on these, also predicted ASI scores. They 
found that the psychosis proneness group had far higher scores on the ASI than either a healthy 
control group, or a “social anhedonia” group (defined by high scores on a measure of non-
positive schizotypal symptomatology). Every affirmative answer on the ASI added a 9% increase 
in the odds of being in the psychosis proneness group. Cicero et al. derived 5 factors from the 
ASI, which they labeled Increased Significance (e.g. item 10: “Do you ever feel the need to 
make sense of seemingly random situations or occurrences?”); Senses Sharpening (e.g. item 12: 
“Do you sometimes feel that you can hear with a greater clarity?”); Impending Understanding 
(e.g. item 17: “Do you sometimes feel like you are on the verge of figuring out something really 
big or important, but you aren’t sure what it is?”); Heightened Emotionality (e.g. item 20: “Do 
you go through periods in which you feel overstimulated by things or experiences that are 
normally manageable?”), and Heightened Cognition (e.g. item 25: “Do you sometimes feel like 
the world is changing and you are searching for an explanation?”). 
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The ASI yields a total score out of 29 (a higher score corresponds to greater degree of 
aberrant salience) derived from yes/no responses to 29 statements. The current study confirmed 
the high internal consistency of this measure (Cronbach’s alpha=0.91). 
3.3.2. Salience Attribution Test (SAT) 
The SAT (Roiser, 2009, Schmidt and Roiser, 2009) is an implicit learning paradigm in 
which participants are shown a series of trials. In each trial a fixation cross appears briefly, 
followed by an image at the top and bottom of the screen. The images they see are of household 
objects or of animals, and they can be blue or red, providing four “dimensions” (red; blue; 
household object; animal) which will be the “task relevant” dimension on any given trial. The 
images stay on screen, but after a variable time delay (between 1000 and 2000 milliseconds) a 
probe image (a black square) appears (for a variable time, clustering around a mean times which 
is equal to participants’ average reaction time during a brief preliminary practice trial), upon 
which participants have to press a single response key ("space") as quickly as possible. They are 
told in advance that on some portion of the trials there is a financial reward for this response, and 
that this will vary with the speed with which they can make it, but they are not told on which 
trials this financial reward occurs. In Roiser et al.’s original version, this financial reward accrues 
to a real payment given to participants at the end of the test. Local ethics considerations mean 
that in the present study participants were told that they were accruing a reward, but in reality 
they were given the same (maximally possible) amount of $20 for participation. In any given 
block of the experiment (each participant completes two blocks of 64 trials), one of these 
dimensions (e.g. "red") is financially rewarded 87.5% of the time while the other (e.g. "blue") is 
rewarded 12.5% of the time. The dimension being rewarded varies from block to block. 
Participants’ reaction times in response to the black-square probe are recorded. The expectation 
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is that participants learn implicitly which dimension (e.g. "redness") is being rewarded and show 
a faster response to “task-relevant” (e.g. red) objects during that block. 
At the end of each block, participants are asked to use a sliding scale to rate the 
percentage likelihood of a reward for each different type of object (i.e. they are asked "on what 
percentage of trials were you rewarded for blue objects/red objects/animals/household objects?") 
They are given a sliding scale for each to rate the likelihood, this scale yields a continuous 
outcome measure of 1-100. 
The Salience Attribution Test thus yields two forms of data, implicit (reaction time) data, and 
explicit (visual analogue scale) data. These in turn are used to calculate four outcome variables 
on which groups can be compared: 
1. Implicit (Reaction Time) adaptive salience. This is attained by calculating the absolute 
difference in reaction time between rewarded and non-rewarded trials. Roiser et al. (2009) do not 
report a normative optimal “score”, but if a significant difference arises between groups on this 
variable, it is indicative that (a) group(s) with a lower degree of implicit adaptive salience is not 
relatively “speeding” toward the financially rewarded trials as much as (an)other group(s). 
2. Explicit (sliding scale-rating) adaptive salience. This variable is derived in a very 
similar way to implicit adaptive salience, by calculating the absolute difference in percentage 
ratings (as opposed to reaction times) given on the visual analogue scale between rewarded and 
non-rewarded trials. As with implicit adaptive salience, it allows for groups to be compared in 
terms of their sense of which dimension of objects came to have a “significant” feeling through 
their association with reward, but instead of being measured through “speeding” in reaction 
times, is measured through subjective judgments of how often rewards were provided.  
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3. Implicit (Reaction Time) aberrant salience. This variable is the putatively pathological 
counterpart to implicit adaptive salience, representing instead the tendency to assign salience 
inappropriately to objects. It is attained by calculating the difference in average reaction times 
between the different non-rewarded trials, which ought to be approximately equal. If a positive 
value is found for the difference in reaction times between types of non-rewarded domain (i.e. if 
the person shows a specific pattern of speeding to "household" objects vs. “animals” on trials 
where a color, “redness”, or “blueness” is being rewarded) then aberrant salience can be said to 
be present. Groups can then be compared in terms of the degree of aberrant salience they 
demonstrate relative to comparison groups.  
4. Explicit (sliding scale) aberrant salience. This variable is derived in a directly 
analogous way to implicit aberrant salience, by calculating any absolute positive difference 
between levels of the task-irrelevant stimuli. (i.e. does a participant person rate "blue" as more 
highly likely to be rewarded than “red” when in fact neither is rewarded for that block?) 
However, unlike implicit aberrant salience, which is derived by calculating any difference 
between reaction times, explicit aberrant salience is obtained by examining differences between 
visual analogue scale ratings given by participants to these task-irrelevant stimuli at the end of 
each block.  
Roiser et al. (2009) did not find any significant group differences in reaction time 
between controls and medicated schizophrenia patients, though there was a non-significant trend 
in this direction. This finding suggests that a group difference in reaction time is unlikely in the 
case of a less severe psychological disorder.  




 In order to examine the presence of a hasty inferential style (or a “jumping to conclusions 
bias”), in the present study participants completed the easy and difficult versions of the 
computerized beads task (Garety et al., 2013). Participants are shown a picture of two jars 
containing 85 beads of one color and 15 of another (easy version) or 60 of one color and 40 of 
the other (difficult version). They are then told that one of the jars has been chosen at random 
and that now beads are going to be drawn from it. Each bead will be replaced, so the proportions 
will remain the same. Participants are told that their job is to decide which jar the beads are 
coming from, and that they can see as many beads as they like before deciding. As beads are 
shown, the previously drawn sequence of beads is also visible at the bottom of the page to act as 
a memory aid. Following most studies using this measure, the presence of a JTC bias was 
defined by requesting two or fewer beads. To control for potentially confounding practice 
effects, the order of presentation of difficult and easy versions was counterbalanced within 
groups in the present study.  
3.3.4. Prodromal Questionnaire (PQ) 
A range of psychometric and structured clinical interview measures exist to diagnose 
high risk states, many of which were developed to facilitate enhanced clinical care of this 
population. However, as Loewy et al. (2005) note, these have often been time consuming to 
deploy, and have limited the speed with which new research can be produced. In order to address 
this, Loewy and colleagues developed a 92-item self-report scale, the Prodromal Questionnaire 
(PQ), adapting questions from existing measures of schizotypy, and structured clinical interviews 
for high risk states (the PQ is regarded as having “descended from” Raine’s, 1991, Schizotypal 
Personality Questionnaire and McGlashan et al.’s, 2010, SIPS, by having integrated information 
from these measures, Daneault et al., 2013). 113 participants completed the PQ and the 
Structured Interview for Prodromal Syndromes (SIPS). It was found that the positive symptom 
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subscale successfully predicted the presence of a SIPS-diagnosed prodromal syndrome, 
suggesting that the PQ has convergent validity with a “gold standard” (Loewy et al., 2005) 
diagnostic instrument. On the basis of these results, Loewy et al. concluded that the presence of 8 
or more “attenuated positive psychotic symptoms” (APPS) on the PQ was a sensitive measure of 
“high risk” state. Subsequent work has yielded a briefer version of the PQ (Loewy et al. 2011), 
and this has been subsequently shown to also have good sensitivity in follow up studies (Kline et 
al., 2015).  
3.3.5. Trail Making Task 
 Participants completed the Trail Making Task from the Delis-Kaplan Executive-Function 
System (DKEFS, Delis et al., 2001) to control for the possibility that performance on the SAT is 
a function of an individual’s capacity for task switching. Participants completed a number of 
different conditions. In condition 2, participants trace a pencil line as quickly as possible 
connecting 16 circles labelled one to 16 while ignoring distractors. In condition 3 participants 
trace a pencil line as quickly as possible connecting 16 circles labelled A to P while ignoring 
distractors. In condition 5, participants follow a similar procedure, tracing a line to join circles in 
a sequential order, but are required to switch between circles labelled with letters and circles 
labelled with numbers. It has been shown that the TMT provides a valid index of an individual’s 
capacity to deploy executive functioning in the service of task switching (Arbuthnott and Frank, 
2000).  
3.4. Procedure 
Data collected as part of an ongoing study of distressing attenuated positive psychotic 
symptoms (DAPPS) were reviewed. Participants who fell into the “low” and “high” PQ-defined 
groups (see section on participants, above) were contacted by phone to participate in an 
experimental procedure. Participants were briefed and asked to sign a consent form. They then 
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completed the Salience Attribution Test on a computer, the Trail Making Task, and a 
computerized version of the beads task. The entire procedure took around 90 minutes to 
complete. The Salience Attribution Test included a tutorial element, with three short blocks of 
learning trials (following the instructions provided by Roiser et al., 2009) to prepare participants 
for the task.  
3.5. Data Analysis: Testing the Hypotheses 
HYP 1: Individuals who display a high number of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms/high 
levels of delusional ideation will demonstrate a high degree of aberrant salience and a “jumping 
to conclusions” bias relative to control participants who display a lower number of such 
symptoms. 
HYP 2: There will be a positive association between aberrant salience and attenuated psychotic 
symptoms, and this will be moderated by a “jumping to conclusions” style of reasoning, such 
that individuals with high levels of JTC will show an association between high aberrant salience 
and attenuated psychotic symptoms. Individuals with low levels of JTC will show less of an 
association between aberrant salience and attenuated psychotic symptoms. 
To test these hypotheses participants in the “high” and “low” scoring group on the PQ 
and were compared in terms of their scores on the measures of aberrant salience and jumping to 
conclusions. Multiple t-tests allowed the comparison of these two groups on the main variables 
of interest. Logistic regression allowed for the investigation of the contribution of the main 
variables for predicting membership of the low and the high groups, and also for the examination 




Chapter 4: Results  
This study sought to examine the relationship between aberrant salience, a probabilistic 
reasoning (“jumping to conclusions”) bias, and the presence of distressing attenuated positive 
psychotic symptoms (DAPPS). Specifically, it sought to examine whether there is a relationship 
between salience processing and attenuated positive psychotic symptoms and whether that 
association is moderated by a hasty reasoning style, such that the aberrant salience-DAPPS 
association is stronger when there is evidence of hastier style of reasoning.  
4.1. Preliminary Analyses 
4.1.1. Demographic Characteristics of the sample 
Sixty-two undergraduate males and females aged 18 to 35 years participated in this study.  
This was a sample of racial/ethnic minorities that was predominately Asian and Hispanic, with a 
higher proportion of female than male participants. Just over 16% of the sample reported an 
ethnic background other than Asian, Black or Hispanic. This approximately reflects the 
demographic makeup of the urban public school system from which the sample was recruited.  
Participants were recruited from a larger ongoing study and screened based on how many 
Distressing Attenuated Positive Psychotic Symptoms (DAPPS) they endorsed on the Prodromal 
Questionnaire (PQ) in that dataset. Individuals who endorsed four or fewer DAPPS were 
considered “low” scorers. Individuals who scored eight or more DAPPS were considered “high” 
scorers.  There were initially 32 low PQ scorers recruited, and 30 high PQ scorers recruited to 
the present study.  
Due to a problem with the computer program that ran the SAT, response times of 16/62 
participants were only partially recorded, substantially biasing SAT data for these participants. 
This left a sample of 46 participants for whom full data were available. Because of the extent of 
SAT data lost, it was regarded as safer to exclude these participants altogether from analyses that 
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required this information, rather than impute missing data. As can be seen in Table. 1. the sample 
for whom full SAT data was not available was demographically similar to the original group. 
However Hispanic students were over-represented among those who were missing. It is not clear 
why this is.  
Table 1-Demographic Characteristics of the sample, including those with SAT data, compared 
with those missing SAT data. 
 Sample with SAT 
data (N=46) 




Age Mean (SD) min-
max 
20.7 (3.4) 18-35 20.63 (2.94) 20.5 (3.33) 18-35 
Male 21 (45.7%) 6 (37.5%) 27 (43.5%) 
Female 25 (54.3%) 10 (62.5%) 35 (56.5%) 
Race/Ethnicity N (%) 
Hispanic 16 (34.8%) 11 (68.75%) 27 (43.5%) 
Black  8 (17.4%) 2 (12.5%) 10 (16.1%) 
Asian 14 (30.4%) 2 (12.5%) 16 (25.8%) 
Other 8 (17.4%) 1 (6.25%) 9 (14.5%) 
 
4.1.2. Clinical characteristics of the sample 
4.1.2.1. DAPPS and total “PQ Positive” score: 
 This section presents detailed data about the average number of DAPPS endorsed by the 
low and high PQ groups. In this study, a cut score of 4 or fewer was used to determine the low 
group, and 8 or more was used to determine the high group. These scores are based specifically 
on the number of distressing positive symptoms endorsed by participants. In the table below, 
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data are also provided on the mean total number of positive symptoms endorsed altogether 
(“total PQ positive), to provide further information about how many attenuated positive 
psychotic experiences (including those that were not identified as distressing) were reported by 
each group.  
Table 2-Total number of DAPPS, and total number of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms 
(APPS) endorsed by the High and Low groups: 
 High (n=32) Low (n=30) 
Mean Total 
DAPPS (SD) 
10.03 (5.5) 2.86 (4.19) 
Mean Total 
Positive PQ (SD) 
37.63 (22.45) 18.41 (19.63) 
4.1.2.2. PQ/RT correlation and group TMT comparison 
  Dividing a sample based on a putative clinical characteristic raises the possibility of 
results being confounded by a systematic difference other than the variable of interest. It may be 
that a group that is elevated in terms of a clinical variable (in this case attenuated positive 
psychotic symptoms) is also different in terms of their overall reaction times, or in terms of their 
capacity to rapidly switch set. As these variables are potential confounds for the current study, 
they were examined prior to the main analyses. 
 Any systematic difference in reaction times, with the High group performing more slowly 
than the Low, might represent a confound in a measure involving group comparisons based on 
reaction time data. Bivariate Pearson correlations were conducted to assess whether slower 
reaction times to high validity SAT items was associated with higher levels of total attenuated 
positive symptoms, or with distressing attenuated positive symptoms. These analyses revealed 
extremely small correlations with none coming close to significance. Participants reporting 
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higher rates of attenuated positive symptomatology did not show any tendency to respond less 
quickly to high validity items than those reporting lower rates. These results are displayed in 
table. 3. 
Table 3-Bivariate Pearson correlations between block 1 and block 2 reaction times, and Total 
number of DAPPS, and total number of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms (APPS): 
  Total Attenuated Positive Psychotic 
Symptoms 
Distressing Attenuated Positive 
Psychotic Symptoms 
Block 1 r=-0.105, n=46, p=0.489 r=0.108, n=46, p = 0.474 
Block 2 r=-0.154, n=46,  p=0.306 r=0.03, n=46,  p = 0.842 
The SAT involves the capacity to switch effectively from responding to one rewarded 
stimulus in Block 1 to a new rewarded stimulus in Block 2. A specific cognitive deficit in the 
capacity to switch sets would thus present a potential confound. To control for this, High and 
Low groups were compared on their performance on Trail Making Test number 4 in the Delis–
Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS) battery. This specific subtest assesses for an 
individual’s capacity to rapidly switch sets. No significant differences were found between low 
and high groups (67.8s and 58.23s respectively) in terms of their performance on Trail Making 
test (t [45]=1.35, p=0.18), suggesting that the groups’ capacity to deploy executive functioning 
skills to shift set was not a confound for any group differences in terms of the SAT.  
4.1.3. Descriptive data 
4.1.3.1. Descriptive Salience Attribution Test (SAT) data: 
If participants responded in less than 100ms this was considered a premature response 
and excluded from analysis, following the precedent set by Roiser et al. (2009). Examination of 
individual level reaction time distributions revealed a consistent pattern of positive skew. 
Following the procedure detailed by Field (2005), skewness data were divided by the standard 
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error of skewness to produce a z-score. Individual distributions all showed a value greater than 
1.96, suggesting the presence of significant positive skew.  To address this issue, all RT data 
were log transformed prior to analysis. Statistical analyses of RT data (presented in Primary 
Analyses section, below) are based on the log transformed data. However, for clarity 
untransformed mean RTs are presented throughout.  
4.1.3.2 Summary descriptive SAT data, current and previous studies: 
Descriptive results are presented for the salience attribution test, following the convention 
of Roiser et al. (2009). The 128 trials of the SAT are broken down into two blocks of 64, with 
different dimensions of the stimulus rewarded in each block. This division of the task into Block 
1 and Block 2 provides a way to examine whether participants are able to effectively re-learn a 
new set of contingencies, and switch to a new pattern of salience attribution. First overall mean 
reaction times for the entire sample are presented in Table 6. Then summary RT data from 
previous published studies are presented to give context to the present data. 
4.1.3.3. Implicit (RT) salience data broken down by block and low/high classification: 
The following series of tables provides descriptive SAT data, broken down into low/high 
DAPPS group comparisons. In the first table, Mean and SD reaction time data are provided for 
the low and the high group in Block 1, Block 2 and overall.  
Table 4-Reaction time data by group and block 
 Low (n=26) High (n=20) 
Mean RT SD Mean RT SD 
Block 1 262.01 57.56 262.53 40.59 
Block 2 264.51 57.45 260.65 42.64 




These data are somewhat different from previous studies reporting SAT reaction times. 
The low group in the present study showed slower reaction times than previously reported 
control groups, and the high group showed quicker reaction times than previously reported 
schizophrenia groups (see Table 5). 
Table 5-Summary reaction time data by group from previous studies: 
 Control  Experimental (designation)  
Schmidt and Roiser (2009)  233.86ms (n/a) 
Roiser et al. (2009) 252.9ms 283.35ms (DSM IV schizophrenia) 
Abboud et al. (2016) 245.67ms 359.06ms (DSM IV schizophrenia & 
“persistent delusions”) 
In the following tables SAT reaction times for the entire sample are broken down by 
block (i.e., Block 1 = the first 64 trials, Block 2 = the second 64 trials) and by the different levels 
of stimulus “validity.” High validity trials are those on which the stimulus was associated with a 
reward. Low validity trials are those on which it was not. 
Table 6 -Summary reaction time data by group, block and stimulus validity: 
 Mean RT (milliseconds) Standard Deviation 
Block 1 High Validity 261.70 49.96 
Block 1 Low Validity 262.77 52.72 
Block 2 High Validity 259.80 50.85 
Block 2 Low Validity 265.87 55.30 
Overall High Validity 260.75 48.26 
52 
 
Overall Low Validity 264.32 51.33 
Stimuli were colored either red or blue, and were either animals or household objects. 
Out of these four stimulus features, one feature (e.g., animals) would be rewarded; while the 
other dimension (e.g., household objects) would not be. This yields reaction times to four 
different types of stimulus (red animals and blue animals; red household objects and blue 
household objects). From these reaction times, estimates of salience attribution can be derived. 
The reaction times are further broken down and presented in two further tables below, using the 
terminology coined by Roiser et al. (2009). This terminology is explained through an example. 
In any given block, if red objects are rewarded, color is the relevant stimulus feature. Red 
objects are high validity stimuli, and blue objects low validity stimuli. Subtracting the former 
from the latter yields an estimate of implicit adaptive salience (a negative value would indicate 
no speeding toward rewarded stimuli, and thus an absence of adaptive salience). The “task 
irrelevant” dimension of the stimulus was the aspect of the stimuli that did not predict any 
reward (in this example, content-i.e. whether the stimulus was an animal or a household object). 
Any difference in reaction times between these two types of content (i.e. speeding toward 
animals relative to household objects) would indicate the presence of aberrant salience. This was 
assessed by averaging reaction times for the two different groups of task irrelevant stimuli and 
subtracting the lower number (“task irrelevant low”) from the higher (“task irrelevant high”). 
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Figure 1-Calculating salience variables on the SAT. 
In table 7, below, the data are further broken down by the different stimuli to which 
participants responded. Reaction times are presented by block and validity level, and by block 





Table 7- SAT reaction time data by group, block and stimulus validity 
 Low (n=26) High (n=20) 
Mean RT SD Mean RT SD 
Block 1 High Validity 263.03 55.94 259.98 42.32 
Block 1 Low Validity 260.99 60.90 265.09 41.14 
Block 2 High Validity 261.73 55.79 257.30 44.91 
Block 2 Low Validity 267.30 62.93 264.01 45 
Block 1 Irrelevant High 270.59 65.33 271.21 48.89 
Block 1 Irrelevant Low 252.24 61.99 260.82 41.92 
Block 2 Irrelevant High 268.25 57.86 272.07 50.81 
Block 2 Irrelevant Low 266.76 76.14 255.66 48.86 
Overall High Validity 262.38 53.59 258.64 41.57 
Overall Low Validity 264.14 58.69 264.55 41.32 
These differences allow for the calculation of the two forms of salience the SAT attempts 
to measure (described above), which are presented in table 8, below. 
Table 8-Implicit salience data by group and block 
 Low (n=26) High (n=20) 
Block 1 Implicit Adaptive Salience (ms) -2.03 (20.47) 5.11 (19.42) 
 Implicit Aberrant Salience (ms) 18.34 (35.01) 10.38 (37.7) 
Block 2 Implicit Adaptive Salience (ms) 5.57 (30.68) 6.7 (28.48) 




4.1.3.4. SAT VAS Rating data:  
In addition to reacting with a key press across 128 trials, participants are asked, at the end 
of each block of 64 trials, to provide a subjective probability rating of how often they received 
money for different types of stimuli (red/blue/animal/household object) on a visual analog scale 
(VAS). Average VAS ratings for each group are presented in the tables below. VAS ratings were 
made on a percentage scale, and thus ranged from 0-100.  
Table 9-Overall VAS rating data by block and stimulus validity 
 Mean VAS Rating Standard Deviation 
Block 1 High Validity 63.80  15.79 
Block 1 Low Validity 28.04 19.53 
Block 2 High Validity 64.26 16.43 
Block 2 Low Validity 35.17 18.06 
Overall High Validity 64.03 11.53 
Overall Low Validity 31.60 13.65 
Explicit salience ratings can be derived from these figures in a manner analogous to the 
derivation of implicit salience ratings. Subtracting average Low Probability ratings from average 
High Probability ratings yields a measure Roiser et al. (2009) term explicit adaptive salience. 
Subtracting average ratings for one level of the task irrelevant stimulus from the other yields a 






Explicit (VAS Rating) Behavioral Salience data for the SAT: 
Table 10-VAS rating and explicit salience data by group, block and stimulus validity.  




Block 1 VAS High Probability  61.12 (16.28) 67.3 (14.8) 
 VAS Low Probability  25.88 (16.51) 30.85 (23.03) 
 VAS irrelevant “high” 59.62 (12.74) 56.05 (13.09) 
 VAS irrelevant “low” 40.54 (14.56) 40.6 (12.81)  
 Explicit Adaptive Salience  35.23 (27.42) 36.45 (30.88) 
 Explicit Aberrant Salience  19.07 (12.28) 15.45 (16.14)  
Block 2 VAS High Probability  62.77 (17.53) 66.20 (15.1)  
 VAS Low Probability  33.92 (19.09) 36.80 (16.96)  
 VAS irrelevant “high” 51.69 (17.81) 56.10 (17.88) 
 VAS irrelevant “low” 37.23 (17.56)  39.05 (17.95)  
 Explicit Adaptive Salience  28.84 (33.79) 29.4 (25.43) 
 Explicit Aberrant Salience  19.30 (22.02) 26.45 (21.55)  
 
To assess whether the reward contingencies of the Salience Attribution Test had been 
successfully learned by participants¸ paired samples t-tests were conducted on the difference 
between overall High Validity reaction times, and overall Low Validity reaction times. 
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Participants tended to respond more quickly to rewarded than to unrewarded stimuli, however, 
this overall group difference in mean reaction times was not significant (t=-1.32 [df=45] p=0.19).  
As expected, participants’ assigned significantly higher VAS ratings to rewarded stimuli 
than to unrewarded stimuli. This difference was significant, t=11.02 (df=45) p < 0.001. This 
pattern of results suggests that participants did not respond notably faster to rewarded stimuli 
than unrewarded, and that reaction time (“implicit”) measures derived from the SAT in this study 
may be insensitive to variations in salience attribution. However, despite this, participants appear 
to have been reliably subjectively sensitive to which stimulus dimension was being rewarded. 
Thus, the measures of explicit salience used in the following analyses can be regarded as valid.  
4.2. Primary Analyses 
4.2.1. Hypotheses: 
 This study sought to examine two hypotheses. The first was that individuals who display 
a high number of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms would demonstrate a high degree of 
aberrant salience and a “jumping to conclusions” bias relative to control participants displaying a 
lower number of such symptoms. The second was that there would be a positive association 
between aberrant salience and attenuated psychotic symptoms, and this would be moderated by a 
“jumping to conclusions” style of reasoning, such that individuals with high levels of JTC would 
show an association between high aberrant salience and attenuated psychotic symptoms. 
Individuals with low levels of JTC would show less of an association between aberrant salience 
and attenuated psychotic symptoms. 
4.2.2. Testing the Hypotheses 
To explore whether group membership had any impact on salience processing across time 
(i.e., whether participants in one group showed a tendency toward improved learning of the 
contingencies relative to the other group), transformed reaction time data were entered into a 
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mixed ANOVA, with Block (1 vs. 2) and Validity (High vs. Low) as within subjects factors, and 
DAPPS high/low group as the between subjects factor. There were no significant main effects 
and no significant interactions, suggesting that there were no systematic differences between the 
groups, either in terms of how they implicitly learned the contingencies, or the extent to which 
they improved over time.  
To explore differences between the task-irrelevant levels of the stimulus over time (i.e., 
changes in aberrant salience), reaction time data were entered into another mixed ANOVA 
model, with Block (1 vs. 2) and Mean RT to the two validity levels of the task-irrelevant 
stimulus (High vs. Low) as within subjects factors, and DAPPS group as the between subjects 
factor. There were no main effects but there was an interaction with significance (F=6.131, 1, 44, 
p = 0.01).  
In order to understand the nature of the interaction, aberrant salience reaction time 
patterns were graphed for high and low DAPPS groups and presented in Figure 1. The graphed 
interaction between task irrelevant high and low reactions times for Block 1 and Block 2 were 
graphed for high and low DAPPS groups. The pattern suggests a difference in the degree to 
which high and low DAPPS groups assigned aberrant salience over time. Namely, these graphs 
reveal that low PQ individuals showed a tendency toward responding equally quickly to both 
levels of the task-irrelevant stimulus over time suggesting a decrease in aberrant salience (i.e., a 
tendency to display less aberrant salience by not responding faster to one unrewarded stimulus 
feature than another). However, the high PQ or DAPPS group did not show this pattern, and 
showed a consistent difference in how quickly they responded between the two levels of the 
category that was not being rewarded over time. This finding represents preliminary evidence for 
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an improvement in learning in the low group that was not found in the high group, which may 
represent improved salience processing in the former.   
  
Figure 2-Reaction time data for implicit aberrant salience 
To explore whether there were differences between rewarded and unrewarded trials, and 
whether these were larger among the High DAPPS than the Low DAPPS participants, VAS 
rating data were entered into a mixed ANOVA, with Block (1 vs. 2) and Validity (High vs. Low) 
as within subjects factors, and group as the between subjects factor. There was a significant main 
effect of block (F=4.86, 1,44, p=0.03), and validity (F=117.39, 1,44, p<0.01). Examination of the 
low and high groups’ VAS ratings graphed by, block and validity (Figures 3 and 4) suggest that 
both DAPPS groups consistently and correctly rated high validity stimuli as more likely to have 
been rewarded relative to low validity trials, and that this accounts for the significant main effect 
of validity. The significant main effect of block was explored with post-hoc paired sample t-tests 
examining VAS ratings across DAPPS groups. Low Validity ratings for block 1 and Block 2, 
and High Validity ratings for block 1 and Block 2 were compared in two paired samples t-tests. 
In neither case was the difference across blocks significant. However, when Low and High VAS 
ratings are averaged together to create two overall (Block 1 and Block 2) VAS ratings variables, 
























ratings increased from Block 1 (mean VAS 45.92, sd=10.50) to Block 2 (mean VAS 49.71, 
sd=8.43). Examination of figure 2 below suggests that this effect was mainly driven by an 
overall tendency toward rating low validity stimuli as more frequently rewarded on the second 
block than on the first. The resultant slight narrowing of the gap between high and low validity 
VAS ratings from block to block suggests a decrease in adaptive salience. This probably results 
from participants having to switch to learning a new set of contingencies in the second block (i.e. 
learning that a different stimulus characteristic was being rewarded). There were no significant 
interactions.  
  
Figure 3-VAS Rating data for explicit adaptive salience 
To explore differences in explicit ratings between the task-irrelevant levels of the 
stimulus from Block 1 to Block 2 (i.e. changes in explicit aberrant salience), reaction time data 
were entered into another mixed ANOVA model, with Block (1 vs. 2) and VAS ratings to the 
two levels of the task-irrelevant stimulus (High vs, Low) as within subjects factors, and DAPPS 
group as the between subjects factor. There was a significant main effect of Validity (F=93.77, 1, 
45, p < 0.01). There were no other significant main effects or interactions. This result suggests 

















































pattern of rating both levels of the task irrelevant stimulus as equally likely to yield a reward.) 
Examination of Figs. 3 below suggests that, while the low PQ participants’ aberrant salience 
remained stable from block to block, the high PQ participants showed an increase in aberrant 
salience from Block 1 to Block 2. However, this effect falls short of significance (F=1.96, 1, 44, 
p=0.28), and appears to be at least partly accounted for by a virtual absence of aberrant salience 
in Block 1 among the High PQ participants.  
  
Figure 4-VAS Rating data for explicit aberrant salience 
4.2.5. Self-Report Aberrant Salience Data 
High PQ participants endorsed a mean of 16.75 out of 29 (SD= 7.8) items on the 
Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI). Low PQ participants endorsed a mean of 10.88 (SD=6.3) 
items. This difference was statistically significant (t=2.97, df=44, p=0.008). 
4.2.6. Probabilistic Reasoning Data 
The second hypothesis of this study was that the positive association between aberrant 
salience and attenuated psychotic symptoms would be moderated by a “jumping to conclusions” 
style of reasoning. The outcome variable for the probabilistic reasoning (beads) task was the 



























coming from. Mean draws to decision for each group are presented in table 11. During the 
current study, additional qualitative observations were made of the approach participants took to 
completing this reasoning task. These observations raise some questions for the traditional 
interpretation of beads-task results, and are included in Appendix A.  
Table 11-Mean Draws to Decision (DTD) for “high” and “low” groups: 
 
High (n=33) Low (n=29) 
85:15 mean DTD (SD) 7.5 (4.3) 6.4 (3.7) 
60:40 mean DTD (SD) 10.7 (3.7) 9 (3.2) 
Participants were administered the two versions of the beads task, the standard 85:15 
version and the more difficult 60:40 version. The latter is harder because it requires participants 
to make a discrimination about a less obvious difference in quantities of beads. Both versions 
were administered because the 60:40 version is regarded as sensitive to less marked differences 
between groups (Broome et al. 2007). Very few participants in this sample displayed the JTC 
bias drawing 3 beads or fewer and there were no statistically significant differences between the 
high and low DAPPS groups on mean DTD.  
4.2.7. Group differences and interaction effects between the two factors 
To assess for DAPPS high vs low group differences on the test variables, multiple 
independent t-tests were conducted to compare group (high vs. low) means for VAS adaptive 
salience block 1, VAS adaptive salience block 2, VAS aberrant salience block 1, VAS aberrant 
salience block 2 the ASI, the 85:15 version of the beads task and the 60:40 version of the beads 
task.  A Bonferroni correction was applied for multiple (7) comparisons, so that the threshold for 
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a significant finding was a p-value of 0.007. Results of multiple comparisons are shown in table 
6 below. 
Table 12-Multiple t-tests of group mean differences on five test variables: 
Variable t-value p-value 
ASI Mean score 2.97 (df=44) 0.008* 
Beads (85:15) .867 (df=60) 0.38 
Beads (60:40) 1.407 (df=60) 0.16 
VAS adaptive Salience B1 0.142 (df=44) 0.89 
VAS aberrant Salience B1 .866 (df=44) 0.39 
VAS adaptive Salience B2 0.61 (df=44) 0.95 
VAS aberrant Salience B2 1.1 (df=44) 0.27 
*=significant at p=0.007. 
The only significant difference between groups was on mean total ASI score, suggesting 
that the groups here did not differ in terms of their draws to decision performance or their 
aberrant salience attribution during a probabilistic learning task.  
To test for the possibility that probabilistic reasoning moderates the association between 
aberrant salience and DAPPS, two logistic regression analyses were completed, using ASI 
aberrant salience and draws to decision for the two different versions of the beads task as 
predictors. Self-reported experiences of aberrant salience were associated with increased odds of 
belonging to the “high” DAPPS group, confirming the first hypothesis of the present study. 
Draws to decision was not reliably associated with increased odds of belonging to the high 
DAPPS group for either version of the beads task. To examine the interaction between aberrant 
salience and performance on the beads task, a third variable was computed to represent the 
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multiplicative term of aberrant salience and draws to decision on the beads task. The interaction 
for both models was non-significant, suggesting that performance on the beads task does not 
moderate the relationship between aberrant salience and DAPPS.  
Table 13-Logistic regression predicting High/Low DAPPS status using Aberrant Salience (ASI) 
and 85:15 Beads Task results: 
 OR 95% CI b (SE) P 
Aberrant Salience (ASI) 1.12 1.02-1.23 0.12 (0.48) 0.01* 
Beads 85:15 1.15 0.62-2.11 0.14 (0.31) 0.65 
ASI*Beads 85:15 1.06 0.9-1.23 0.05 (0.07) 0.46 
 
Table 14-Logistic regression predicting High/Low DAPPS status using Aberrant Salience (ASI) 
and 60:40 Beads Task results: 
 OR 95% CI b (SE) P 
Aberrant Salience (ASI) 1.12 1.02-1.23 0.12 (0.48) 0.01* 
Beads 60:40 1.45 0.66-3.14 0.37 (0.39) 0.34 
ASI*Beads 60:40 1.075 .935 - 1.235 0.07 (0.07) 0.31 
This pattern of results suggests that probabilistic reasoning did not moderate the 
association between aberrant salience and DAPPS in this sample. This finding is inconsistent 
with the second hypothesis being examined here.  
4.3. Secondary Analyses  
4.3.1. DAPPS Instability 
 The results of this study show few significant differences between low and high DAPPS 
participants on the measures of interest. This may partly result from an unexpected degree of 
instability in DAPPS over time. There were initially 32 low PQ scorers recruited, and 30 high PQ 
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scorers recruited to the present study. The PQ was administered to the current sample of 
participants anywhere between two months up to a year prior to commencement of recruitment 
for the present study. Given this time lag, all participants were administered the PQ a second 
time at present study commencement to provide a current assessment of attenuated positive 
psychotic symptomatology. Sixteen of the participants’ PQ scores at this second administration 
led to different low/high classification, suggesting a degree of instability in attenuated symptoms 
for around a quarter of participants.  
As a result of this change, PQ status at the point of recruitment did not always reflect PQ 
status at the point of the experiment. Given this fact, it was decided to explore, in secondary 
analyses, whether there were differences between participants based on other more specific 
derivations of PQ status that accounted for the time lag between recruitment and study 
commencement. Two additional ways of classifying these participants in terms of PQ status are 
possible. One is based on a simple re-classification, based on their most recent PQ score. Under 
this classification, 29 participants reported four DAPPS or fewer when tested again at the point 
of the experiment, falling into the “low” group (mean: 1.45 S.D: 1.52). Twenty-seven reported 
eight or more DAPPS at the point of the experiment, falling into the “high” group (Mean: 12.44 
SD: 4.33). 6 individuals fell into neither of the two a priori determined groups, scoring an 
average of 6 DAPPS (SD: 2). 
A second way to reclassify participants based on PQ status involves a longitudinal 
consideration of an individual as being either stably-low, stably-high, or variable. Most 
participants who moved, did so clearly from one category to another and were thus classified as 
variable (and excluded from analyses).  However, two participants endorsed eight or more 
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DAPPS at time one, and seven or more at time two. To accommodate some minimal variability, 
these were classified as stably high.   
Table 15-Participants whose group status changed: 








1 13 0 High to Low Variable 
2 15 0 High to Low Variable 
3 8 4 High to Low Variable 
4 12 3 High to Low Variable 
5 8 2 High to Low Variable 
6 10 4 High to Low Variable 
7 10 3 High to Low Variable 
8 9 7 High to Middle Stable High 
9 10 7 High to Middle Stable High 
10 9 6 High to Middle Variable 
11 2 7 Low to Middle Variable 
12 4 7 Low to Middle Variable 
13 2 16 Low to High Variable 
14 0 13 Low to High Variable 
15 2 9 Low to High Variable 




The analyses presented in the main body of this results section are based on PQ status at 
the point of recruitment. However re-analyses for alternative groupings were also performed to 
assess whether these different groupings had an impact on findings. Even with the division of the 
sample into different low/high configurations, the results remained the same, with no significant 
group differences in terms of the SAT salience variables, or draws to decision on the beads task. 
The finding of a significant difference in self-report aberrant salience (ASI) was stable for each 
of the other two possible configurations of low/high grouping. For the results pertaining to these 
alternative groupings, see Appendix. B. 
4.3.2. PQ/ASI divergent validity 
To examine the convergent and divergent validity of the PQ and ASI, and explore the 
extent to which they are different but related constructs, Pearson correlations between total 
number of DAPPS and total ASI score across the entire sample were carried out. The number of 
DAPPS correlated significantly with total ASI score (r=0.35, p=0.006). The total number of PQ 
positive symptoms and the total ASI score also correlated significantly with total ASI score 
(r=0.34, p=0.009). These correlations are significant, but only medium in terms of effect size. 
This result suggests a robust association between these measures. However the association is less 
than the 0.85 threshold suggested by Campbell and Fiske (1959) in their discussion of divergent 
validity. This provides some tentative support for the hypothesis that the positive symptom scale 
of the PQ and the ASI measure different underlying constructs, and is consistent with the 
moderately sized correlations between the ASI and psychosis proneness measures examined in 
Cicero et al. (2010). However this should be regarded as an exploratory and suggestive finding. 
Further work is required to establish the divergent validity of the ASI.  
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4.3.3. Exploratory SAT/ASI convergent validity 
This is the first study to employ the two extant measures specifically designed to assess 
aberrant salience attribution (the ASI and the SAT) and thus affords an opportunity to examine 
their convergent validity. A correlation between two measures in such different domains (self-
report vs. experimental) would provide support for the assumption, present in the extant 
literature, that they are both measuring the same phenomenon. To examine this aspect of 
convergent validity, bivariate correlations were performed between Block 1 VAS Aberrant 
Salience, Block 2 VAS Aberrant Salience, and Total ASI score. Block 1 VAS Aberrant Salience 
actually correlated negatively with total ASI, though this effect was small and not statistically 
significant (r=-0.178, n=46, p=0.236). However, Block 2 VAS Aberrant Salience showed a small 
positive, and statistically significant correlation with total ASI (r=0.385, n=46, p=.008).  
  
Figure 5-Scatterplots showing self-report aberrant salience (ASI) plotted VAS aberrant salience 
































































Chapter 5: Discussion 
 The present study sought to investigate the relationship between two cognitive factors, 
aberrant salience and the jumping to conclusions bias, and their relationship to clinically 
significant attenuated positive psychotic symptoms. This was the first study to examine aberrant 
salience using experimental and self-report methods, and the first to do so in a non-treatment 
seeking population. Additionally it was the first study to examine aberrant salience experiences 
and probabilistic reasoning together in the context of a multifactorial theory of psychosis. It was 
hypothesized that individuals self-reporting a clinically significant number of positive psychotic-
like symptoms would be more likely to exhibit the tendency to place salience on irrelevant 
stimuli. This was supported in that high scoring individuals on a prodromal questionnaire scored 
higher on an inventory of aberrant salience. Furthermore, using experimental methods, it was 
found that self-reported, subjective feelings of sharpened senses and enhanced awareness 
correlated with aberrant salience attribution on a rating scale during a behavioral task, in the 
context of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms.  
5.1. Summary of findings 
The main finding from the present study was that individuals who endorse elevated levels 
of distressing attenuated psychotic symptomatology tended to also report experiences of elevated 
salience dysregulation than a group who reported only average levels of such symptoms. This 
finding is consistent with Hypothesis one, and provides support for the proposed link between 
psychosis and aberrant salience. However, contrary to previous studies that have deployed the 
Salience Attribution Test in populations with psychotic symptoms or high risk states, and 
contrary to what was hypothesized, this study did not find any associations between DAPPS and 
any of the SAT outcome variables. The failure to find any such association is novel, and appears 
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to contradict the aberrant salience hypothesis. Reasons for such a failure to replicate are explored 
further below.  
Contrary to one of this study’s main hypotheses, individuals with elevated attenuated 
psychotic symptoms did not show a tendency to select fewer beads before drawing a conclusion 
about which of two jars the beads were coming from, i.e., they did not show evidence of any 
tendency towards a jumping to conclusions bias. Although this finding was not predicted, it is 
consistent with an interpretation of the two-factor model, as will be discussed below in the 
section Findings in Context. The lack of an association between DAPPS and draws to decision 
on the beads task also meant that the third major hypothesis of the study was not confirmed: 
there was no moderation of the relationship between aberrant salience and DAPPS by number of 
beads drawn. Drawing fewer beads did not yield a stronger relationship between aberrant 
salience and DAPPS.  
5.2. Interpretation of findings 
Overall the results discussed here are consistent with (but not strongly corroborative of) a 
model in which distressing attenuated positive psychotic symptoms are associated with aberrant 
salience; an inappropriate sense of subjective significance which may contribute to the 
development of experiences like having a delusional belief, or seeing/hearing things which aren’t 
there. However, the evidence is mixed. While the significant difference between experimental 
groups on the self-report salience measure (the ASI) supports this interpretation, the absence of 
any such difference on the experimental/behavioral measure (the SAT) does not. The mixed 
pattern of findings regarding salience is open to several potential interpretations.  
First, it may be that the ASI provides a more sensitive measure of salience processing 
than the SAT, and that it is thus able to detect relatively small differences between the two 
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groups examined here. In favor of this interpretation is the fact that the ASI relies on self-
reported subjective experiences. The experiences in question are generally quite subtle in 
character (e.g. “has your sense of taste ever seemed quite acute?”). It is prima facie plausible that 
such subtle alterations in subjectivity could be present in non-clinical manifestations of 
attenuated psychosis, without the additional presence of more pronounced cognitive distortions 
of the sort that would give rise to differential performance on an experimental task. This 
interpretation is also supported by the fact that the subjective VAS ratings in the SAT did show a 
reliable difference between rewarded and unrewarded stimuli.  
A second interpretation is that the implementation of the SAT in this study was flawed in 
some way. In terms of reaction time, the overall sample did not show a tendency toward more 
rapid responding to rewarded items, and did not show a pattern of “implicit adaptive salience.” 
Such a finding limits the applicability of the reaction time results for understanding aberrant 
salience, and may account for why there was no group difference in terms of implicit aberrant 
salience. However, against this interpretation the rating scale results (explicit salience) did yield 
a clear pattern of higher likelihood ratings for rewarded items, indicating successful attribution of 
explicit adaptive salience among all participants, as expected. This suggests that, despite the 
failure of the task to detect speeding toward rewarded stimuli, participants could reliably judge 
which stimuli were being rewarded. The failure to detect a group difference in terms of explicit 
aberrant salience on this measure is thus interpretable in terms other than the simple failure of the 
SAT to accurately detect salience attribution.  
A third interpretation is that the failure to find group differences on the SAT is a result of 
Type-II error, as the sample size limited the power of the experiment to find any such effect. 
This possibility (also discussed in the section on Limitations, below) cannot be corroborated or 
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refuted. Even with the loss of power that resulted from the data loss, the sample size here is 
similar in size to previous SAT studies that have found positive results. 
The self-report and experimental rating-scale measures of aberrant salience were found to 
be correlated (i.e. self-report aberrant salience correlated with Block 2 Explicit aberrant salience, 
salience). This result provides some tentative support for the hypothesis that they are measuring 
the same construct. The use of two approaches to measuring salience attribution represents a 
strength of this study. No work has yet been conducted to examine subjective experiences of 
aberrant salience while also investigating experimental attribution of salience. Future studies 
could fruitfully set out to more explicitly examine the construct validity of aberrant salience by 
examining the covariation of these alternate forms of assessing it.  
In terms of incautious reasoning, the lack of a group difference on the beads task is 
consistent with an interpretation on which high levels of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms 
(which have not crossed the threshold into “full blown” psychosis) are not associated with more 
hasty reasoning. In fact, the results here show a trend towards more beads being drawn by the 
High PQ group on both variations of the task, a finding which runs contrary to that which was 
expected. This null result is most parsimoniously interpreted as indicating the lack of any 
difference in probabilistic reasoning between groups who are defined solely in terms of 
attenuated symptomatology. Such a finding is consistent with an interpretation under which 
probabilistic reasoning is not a relevant factor in determining whether people experience 
attenuated psychotic symptomatology. Rather, such symptomatology may represent early 
disturbances in perception and subjective self-experience, which are nonetheless still capable of 
being “managed” by intact reality testing. This theoretical formulation is made explicitly by 
Beck and Warman (2004), who suggest that cognitive insight is essential to the distinction 
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between anomalous experiences and full blown psychosis. These authors place probabilistic 
reasoning at the center of their view of insight, saying that this construct is “impeded by 
premature closure (“jumping to conclusions”) and overconfidence in the rightness of […] 
inferences” (p.85). This two-factor interpretation is also supported by previous studies, which 
have found significant differences in neurocognitive performance between individuals who are in 
an “at risk” state and individuals who have developed a full blown psychotic illness (Pukrop et 
al., 2005). However there is also a substantial body of evidence to suggest that neuro-cognition 
assessed longitudinally over the development of psychosis reveals no pattern of decline from 
prodromal status to full blown illness (Bora and Murray, 2014). Such a pattern, when combined 
with evidence for the stability of the JTC bias in deluded patients over time (Peters and Garety, 
2006) suggests that differences in performance on such tasks may distinguish between 
individuals likely to go on to develop psychosis and individuals who do not. Broome et al. 
(2012) examined this directly by following up after two years with a small sample of at risk 
individuals who had completed the 85:15 and 60:40 versions of the beads task at the start of the 
study. They found no significant difference between those who had and those who had not 
converted to psychosis, but their relatively small sample (28 individuals, five of whom had 
developed psychosis) limits the strength of the conclusions that can be drawn from their 
research. More research is needed on this question.  
Considered alongside other similar findings with the beads task specifically, the present 
result is consistent with the possibility that an “epistemological impulsivity” (Bentall, 2004) 
associated with the jumping to conclusions bias could be an important factor in the development 
of more severe forms of psychotic symptomatology. Qualitative examination of the experiences 
of prodromal individuals is consistent with this suggestion. Investigators have suggested that the 
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prodrome can entail preoccupation with analyzing the reality of overvalued ideas, suggesting a 
degree of epistemic caution (the opposite of a Jumping to Conclusions bias) among these 
individuals (Møller et al., 2000). For example, one of Møller et al.’s participants reported “I had 
to define and analyze everything I was thinking about.” (p.222). In a more anecdotal vein, Aviv 
(2010) said of a young patient that “she seemed to have come closer to psychosis than any other 
patient I interviewed there, but she used a few shreds of logic to tether herself to reality.” (p.46).  
A recent qualitative examination of the experiences of psychosis (Jones et al. 2015) also drew 
attention to the apparently deliberate quality that psychosis can involve, and the importance of 
applying deliberative reasoning to keep it in check. This experience should be explored in greater 
detail in more rigorous qualitative studies. The possibility that beads-task performance is better 
among “high risk” populations than in either psychotic or “low risk” samples is discussed further 
below, in the section Results in Context.  
5.3. Current Findings in Context 
Previous studies of aberrant salience and probabilistic reasoning have largely treated 
these factors individually. Although both variables (especially the latter) have been consistently 
associated with various forms and degrees of psychotic experiences, they have not been explored 
in combination with one another. Understanding how they might interact is of particular interest 
for two reasons. The first is that they have each been incorporated into broad, multifactorial 
theoretical models of psychosis which require multifactorial empirical testing. The second is that 
the extent to which they are theoretically distinct remains poorly understood. It is possible that 
aberrant salience and probabilistic reasoning are two sides of the same coin. For example, 
aberrant salience attribution might lead to a premature cessation of bead selection because beads 
are imbued with subjective explanatory significance before the point at which it is rational to 
stop viewing them. However they may also represent unrelated cognitive abilities. This issue 
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needs to be far better understood before the psychology of psychosis can be fully explicated. The 
current findings potentially shed some light on the interplay of these two variables in the 
production of attenuated psychotic symptoms, and their role can be even better understood by 
comparing the present study to previous findings in the same field.  
In this section, the current results are considered in the light of relevant previous findings. 
The present finding of no group difference in SAT performance between low and high scorers on 
the PQ is inconsistent with experimental studies that have found Aberrant Salience in “at risk” 
type populations. Roiser et al. (2012) found that an Ultra High Risk (UHR) for psychosis group 
scored significantly higher than controls on explicit aberrant salience as measured by the SAT. 
This result stands in contrast to the present study. This inconsistency may reflect differences in 
the respective samples. A clear difference between this study and that of Roiser at el. is in the 
earlier study’s use of individuals who were (1) seeking mental health treatment, and (2) 
diagnosed as being “high risk” by the Comprehensive Assessment of At Risk Mental State 
(CAARMS) criteria. This measure involves the use of a structured clinical interview to establish 
who is at risk, setting a substantially higher threshold for inclusion in the at risk group.  This 
higher threshold for the “at risk” group might account for the difference between those and the 
present results. However, it is also worth noting that two (out of 18) of Roiser et al.’s participants 
had previously taken psychiatric medications, and that their engagement with mental health 
services may be indicative of other differences in social/mental functioning that might have 
contributed to their results. The use of psychiatric medications may have an impact on 
processing speed and thus make experimental reaction times generally slower and more erratic. 
The presence of clinically significant psychiatric symptomatology may be associated with group 
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differences in attention or other executive functions. These might be expected to impact 
performance in a task that draws on sustained vigilance, set shifting and working memory.  
Haslegrove et al. (2015) examined aberrant salience in a college population that bore 
more similarities to the present sample, and their findings would be expected to be similar to 
those reported here. Haslegrove et al. assigned undergraduates to high/low groups on the basis of 
their scores on a self-report measure of schizotypy, and administered tasks to assess for latent 
inhibition, blocking, and learned irrelevance, three attentional learning phenomena that the 
researchers posited were associated with salience regulation. While low schizotypy participants 
demonstrated an attentional bias towards stimuli that were predictive of trial outcome, and faster 
responses toward stimuli with predictive validity, high schizotypy participants did not show such 
an effect. Although they did not employ the SAT, Haselgrove et al.’s study suggests that non-
medicated, non-helping seeking individuals who score high on measures of schizotypy do show 
evidence of aberrant salience. This stands in contrast to the current study, lending support to the 
possibility that the absence of a significant group difference in aberrant salience represents Type-
II error.  
Moving to previous studies that have looked at self-reported aberrant salience, the present 
results fit with other literature using the same measure. In multiple studies, its authors have 
found that self-reported aberrant salience is associated with elevated rates of psychotic like 
experiences. (Cicero et al., 2010, 2013) The present results thus represent a modest replication of 
these findings, adding to a picture in which aberrant salience plays an important role in early or 
sub-clinical psychotic experiences.  
In terms of the role of probabilistic reasoning (beads task performance), the present 
results stand in contrast to several studies that have found an association between sub-clinical 
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psychotic experiences and the jumping to conclusions bias (Broome et al. 2007, Bensi et al., 
2010, Cafferkey et al., 2014). However, they are also consistent with a small emerging literature 
discussed in the Introduction that has examined beads task performance across the psychosis 
spectrum (Warmans et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2010; Ho Wai So and Kwok, 2015). One 
possible role for probabilistic reasoning as a second factor in psychosis, is that it provides a 
check on anomalous experiences, to prevent them from being interpreted in a way that leads to 
the development of delusional or hallucinatory experiences. If this is an accurate 
characterization, we might expect to see a distinct pattern when we compare individuals across 
the psychotic spectrum. Specifically, we might predict the least cautious reasoning style to be 
shown by individuals with frank psychosis (who do not have anomalous experiences “reigned 
in”), and the most cautious reasoning style to be seen in individuals with sub-clinical psychotic 
experiences (who do have such experiences “reigned in” or reality tested). Individuals without 
elevated levels of sub-clinical psychotic experiences might be expected to show probabilistic 
reasoning that is intermediate between these extremes, or indistinguishable from sub-clinical 
participants. As was outlined in the introduction to this study, this is precisely the pattern that has 
been shown in the four previous studies that have examined this phenomenon. It is this pattern 
that is consistent with the current results. The non-clinical group of psychosis-prone individuals 
studied here did not demonstrate any tendency to “jump to conclusions” in a simple reasoning 
task, despite displaying elevated levels of self-reported aberrant salience and distressing 
attenuated positive psychotic symptoms. This pattern of results suggests a growing picture in 
which clinically significant psychosis is distinguishable from psychotic-like phenomena by the 
absence of probabilistic (reality testing) reasoning processes that act to protect an individual 
from losing touch with reality. 
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The nature of the sample in the current study is an important consideration when trying to 
understand departures from previous studies. In contrast to many studies of undergraduate 
populations, which draw on a predominantly white sample, the current study was predominantly 
non-white and drawn from a population of first-generation college students from immigrant 
families of lower socio-economic status. This may play a role in understanding why the present 
administration of the SAT did not detect a difference in terms of reaction-time based adaptive 
salience. However, it is also interesting to note that some of the outcomes in this study were 
replications of previous findings. This extends these results into new terrain, with a 
demographically broader sample.   
5.4. Implications of the current findings 
The finding that non-help seeking individuals who are high in DAPPS demonstrate 
elevated levels of aberrant salience replicates previous work (Cicero et al., 2010, 2013, 
Haslegrove et al., 2015) and provides further tentative support for the aberrant salience theory of 
positive psychotic symptoms. The fact that this association is seen in a group of undergraduates 
who were not recruited on the grounds of a clinical diagnosis or decline in social functioning 
supports the putative specificity of the relationship between attenuated psychotic phenomena and 
aberrant salience. This is not an association that is driven by incidental factors that have to do 
with being clinically psychotic or taking psychiatric medications that target dopaminergic 
neurons. Kapur’s theory predicts that aberrant salience should be present from early on in the 
development of psychotic experiences, and that is corroborated by the current findings.  
The findings in the current study provide some tentative support for a multi-factorial 
theory of psychosis. The apparent lack of any association between the number of beads drawn, 
and the presence of elevated levels of aberrant salience is concordant with a proposal that these 
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two components are important contributors to the development of psychosis, but not sufficient in 
isolation.  Under the two-factor model, aberrant salience would provide experiential evidence 
that something new and strange was happening, and would lead to the early, attenuated 
experiences of oddness and difference that characterize prodromal or “psychosis-prone” states. A 
separate deficit in evaluating evidence in an appropriately cautious way would contribute to the 
acceptance or “incorporation” (e.g. Gerrans, 2014) of this evidence into a person’s view of 
reality, in the form of accepting delusional beliefs or coming to believe that heard voices are 
separate from oneself.  
It is also consistent with an interpretation under which the contributions of aberrant 
salience and probabilistic reasoning biases are distinct components. This runs contrary to single 
factor models of psychosis such as the predictive coding framework (Griffin and Fletcher, 2017) 
in which the deficits and symptoms of psychosis are explained by a generalized deficit in the 
hierarchical prediction processes that allow the brain to make inferences about and update its 
working model of reality. Under this latter framework, the experience of aberrant salience arises 
from unresolved prediction error arising in neural perceptual and motor feedback systems. 
5.5. Limitations 
The current study suffers from a number of limitations. The most significant limitation 
was the ultimate sample size of the study. An original sample of sixty-two participants was 
reduced to forty-six by a programming error that led to a loss of data. The change in sample size 
represents a loss of statistical power. To some minor extent, the issue of power is addressed by 
the fact that multiple analyses, dividing the groups in different ways, all found similar results. 
These re-analyses cannot stand as replications as they draw from the same sample, but the lack 
of variation from analysis to analysis does suggest that the present findings are not merely driven 
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by idiosyncratic extremes within the data set. More encouragingly, many of the results here are 
consistent with previous studies, and make theoretical sense. However, the limited sample size 
means that the study is potentially under-powered and that its results should be regarded as 
preliminary and suggestive. The absence of significant group differences on salience attribution 
may be the result of Type-II error.  
Local ethics requirements meant that the financial reward component of the SAT in the 
current study had to be implemented differently than in previous uses of the task. Previously 
published studies using this measure have provided a financial reward to participants that is 
determined by their performance on the task. The ethics committee that oversaw the current 
study determined that the use of variable financial rewards was unethical. As an alternative, 
participants were informed that their financial compensation would be determined by SAT 
performance, but then all were provided with the same reimbursement. This difference should 
not have impacted participant SAT performance, as remuneration was provided after the 
completion of the task. However, participants were debriefed to determine whether this 
deception had been successful. Eleven out of forty-six reported that they had definitely not fallen 
for the deception, and three reported that they had questioned it but not reached a firm 
conclusion. When asked why the deception had not worked, three participants reported that it 
had been due to misunderstanding the recruitment call (which had stated the possibility of 
receiving up to $20) to mean that participants would definitely receive $20. One stated that he 
felt psychology “had a reputation” for deceiving people. Two reported that they did not think the 
computer (an ordinary PC laptop) was capable of calculating a financial reward on the basis of 
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reaction times. The remaining five were not able to provide a reason for the failure of the 
deception, but reported feeling that they had “just figured it out,” or that “it didn’t seem right”.5  
It is not clear what impact this difference had on SAT performance. It is unlikely that it 
accounts for the failure to observe adaptive salience in the sample, as only a minority reported 
that they hadn’t fallen for the deception, and of these, four spontaneously reported that they had 
still put forth their best effort into the game as they had not felt the money to be important 
(participants were not systematically asked whether they had put forth their best effort). 
However, it is possible that the inability to genuinely yoke SAT performance to financial 
reimbursement had some impact on participant engagement with the task in a way that impacted 
performance.  
One final consideration is worth examining when evaluating the absence of group 
differences seen in the current sample; the nature of the measure by which the groups were 
defined. During recruitment the PQ was deployed to distinguish a group that was meaningfully 
“high” in sub-clinical psychotic experiences from a group that was meaningfully low in such 
experiences. The cut score for a “low” group member was based on the mean number of 
Distressing Attenuated Positive Psychotic Symptoms seen in the broader sample from which 
these participants were drawn. However, the upper cut score (eight or more DAPPS to be 
included in the “high” group) was derived from a diagnostic study which administered the 
measure to a help-seeking sample attending a prodromal research clinic (Loewy et al. 2005). 
Thus the current study may have failed to divide people into theoretically meaningful groups.  
                                                            
5 One of the participants who had questioned the deception but not reached a firm conclusion stated “I sort of 
thought it was a deception, but then I didn’t think you would do that!”  
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 This study examined “high” vs. “low” scorers on a symptom measure administered to 
non-help seeking college undergraduates. Such an approach is by now reasonably well 
established within experimental psychopathology, and various different measures have been 
deployed to explore the characteristics of delusion/hallucination “prone” individuals, or 
individuals who experience attenuated symptomatology (e.g. Peters et. al, 2004, Freeman, 2006, 
Sommer et al., 2010, Reeves et al., 2014). However, it is possible that it yields “high” and “at 
risk” groups that are very different from clinical cases of psychosis. Additionally, there is likely 
to be variation between “at risk” groups between studies, depending on what type of symptom 
measure is used. Psychosis is a complex, multi-factorial phenomenon (Lincoln, 2007). To 
suggest that the difference between clinically significant positive psychotic symptoms and 
attenuated positive symptoms is only a matter of degree is to potentially misunderstand the 
phenomena. Individuals with psychosis also exhibit a range of neurocognitive deficits, (Saykin et 
al., 1994, Green, 1998, Choi et al., 2013), problems with social functioning (Dickerson et al., 
1999, Green, 2000) and experiences of subjective strangeness that do not readily fall into the 
categories provided by mainstream descriptive psychiatry (see e.g., Sass, 1994, Sass and Parnas, 
2003, Handest et al., 2015). The differences between an individual suffering from psychosis, and 
one reporting statistically elevated levels of attenuated psychotic symptoms may extend beyond 
the severity of the symptom present, making it difficult to draw reliable inferences about one by 
studying the other. Accordingly, any results from a study with this population should be 
interpreted cautiously.  
5.5.1. Does the SAT measure salience attribution? 
Apart from specific limitations of this study, a broader potential limitation of the SAT 
became apparent over the course of data collection, which has implications for all studies which 
have deployed the measure.  Because this issue has broader ramifications than the present study, 
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it will be discussed in some detail in the current section. The limitation in question pertains to the 
assumption that the Salience Attribution Test is a valid measure of the construct of salience. In 
this section I explore this assumption in the light of the present results and the rest of the extant 
literature. I will suggest that there are potentially serious flaws in the assumption, and that this 
leads to a need for further construct validation of the SAT in future research.  
The SAT is a behavioral task which yields a series of reaction times and subjectivity 
judgements. How these are derived (and their names; “implicit/explicit, adaptive/aberrant 
salience”) is outlined in the method section above. The theory is that each of the four main 
output variables pertain principally to salience attribution. However, an alternative interpretation 
is available.  The task involves responses to reward, so it is possible that it measures (or contains 
interference from) a participant’s subjective sense of pleasure and motivation pertaining to that 
reward, as opposed to the sense of significance the reward came to acquire. It is known that 
patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia experience a range of motivational and hedonic 
deficits, which have been implicated in social functioning (Foussias et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
deficits in motivation have been shown to have a pervasive impact on cognitive task performance 
(Summerfeldt et al., 1991, Fervaha et al., 2014). Research using the SAT in schizophrenia 
patients is potentially vulnerable to misinterpretation. A closer examination of previous data 
using the SAT with this population is consistent with the possibility that anhedonia could be a 
confounding factor in interpreting its results. Both pleasure and salience processing have a well-
established link to the mesolimbic dopamine system (Berridge & Robinson, 1998), so clarity 




5.6. Future Directions 
Our understanding of what distinguishes individuals at risk for psychosis from those who 
have transitioned to full blown psychotic illness remains underdeveloped. Research examining 
the factors which predict conversion has recently been criticized for small sample sizes and poor 
methodological quality (Studerus et al., 2017). This is a field with substantial clinical 
significance. Psychosis is traumatic, socially and economically deleterious to individuals who 
experience it, and difficult to treat successfully.  Preventing it depends partly on understanding 
what distinguishes those who do and those who do not transition. Cognitive interventions have 
targeted potential psychological mechanisms that may work to keep attenuated psychotic 
symptoms from developing into full blown psychosis (Moritz and Woodward, 2007). 
Understanding exactly which cognitive mechanisms distinguish those who do from those who 
don’t transition can help to focus such interventions more precisely. Future work should continue 
to examine the inter-relations between cognitive processes associated with attenuated psychotic 
symptoms.  
The current study is among the first to explore the distinction between two factors that 
have been theoretically linked to psychosis, aberrant salience and incautious reasoning. It 
remains a live question how distinct these really are, and some accounts of the Jumping to 
Conclusions bias suggest that it is itself driven by salience processing (e.g. Speechley et al., 
2010). One way to approach this question would be to recruit non-psychotic groups defined by 
cut-scores on the beads task (a jump to conclusions group, defined by a draw-to-decision score of 
two or less, and a group who draw an average or above average quantity of beads) and 
specifically compare them on various measures of saliency processing (including experimental 
and self-report/phenomenology measures). Such an approach would be better able to establish 
the extent of any overlap between salience processing and probabilistic reasoning, and rule out 
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the potential confound of their independent correlations with psychotic phenomena. 
Additionally, other characteristics of reasoning in such a specially recruited “jump to 
conclusions” group could ascertain precisely how this reasoning style could contribute to 
psychotic symptoms. Are healthy individuals who display the bias also prone to endorsing a 
wider range of beliefs on an instrument like the Cardiff Beliefs Questionnaire (Pechey and 
Halligan, 2010)? Alternatively, do such individuals show deficits in other forms of reality testing 
when compared with non-jump-to-conclusions participants? 
The study of aberrant salience in psychosis remains underdeveloped, despite a significant 
influence on the theoretical literature. The present discussion suggests some significant 
limitations with the experimental approach to studying the phenomenon. However, self-reported 
aberrant salience (as measured by the ASI) captures an aspect of subjective experience that is of 
great importance to the theory. Two types of study could now significantly contribute to our 
understanding of the role of aberrant salience in the onset and development of psychosis. First, 
longitudinal self-report studies are required in order to discern whether experiences of aberrant 
salience genuinely precede the onset of full-blown psychosis, and thus whether they seem to play 
the role that has been theoretically assigned to them. Evidence that documented the onset of 
subjective feelings of elevated salience prior to the emergence of symptoms, and demonstrated 
an association between those experiences and symptoms, would lend stronger evidence to the 
supposition that salience dysregulation is an important causal mechanism. Second, more detailed 
studies are required to explore whether aberrant salience plays a role in all positive psychotic 
symptoms (as predicted by Kapur, 2003) or more so in some than in others. In the growing 
literature on specific psychotic symptoms, more weight is generally given to aberrant salience in 
theories of delusion formation (see e.g. Gurin and Blum, 2017) than it is in theories of auditory 
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hallucinations. Studies that compare groups with different sorts of positive psychotic symptoms 
(hallucinations vs. delusions) could provide evidence that bears on the relative importance of this 





Beads Task: Behavioral Observations: 
In the current study, participants were observed during administration of the beads task, 
providing some insight into how they approached it. This revealed the presence of some 
idiosyncratic reasoning processes in participants’ approach to the task, which may have 
implications for how the results from the beads task are interpreted. It appears to be a general 
assumption that participants approach the task in an intuitive manner, without making 
calculations, just waiting for the feeling that they have seen enough beads to decide. If this 
assumption is incorrect, the reporting of the numeric “draws to decision” variable may not 
provide a consistent picture of the reasoning style used by participants. In the rest of this section 
I outline these apparent idiosyncrasies, and discuss their implications for the interpretation of the 
beads task.  
 As expected, the modal style of reasoning on the beads task in current participants did 
appear to be an attempt to get an imprecise, good enough sense of which of the two jars the 
beads were coming from. Participants seemed to wait until they had an intuitive feeling that they 
knew which jar was most likely. However, some participants approached the task in an 
idiosyncratic way. One participant (who was recruited as a “high” participant, but who endorsed 
only seven DAPPS on the day of the experiment) stopped the experimenter after hearing the 
instructions and before the beads were shown. He reported that he could tell me in advance that 
he would like to see eight beads on the 85:15 version and that he would decide after the eighth. 
On the 60:40 version he reported that he would like to see ten beads and that he would decide 
after that.  Another participant (“high”; nine DAPPS) drew fewer beads than average in both 
conditions (four on the 85:15 version and seven on the 60:40 version), but requested at the start 
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of the procedure that the experimenter wait a moment as she would be able to work out how to 
calculate it. She also responded to the verbal instruction “only decide when you are certain” by 
saying “I’m never certain!”6 When the experimenter asked how she was calculating, she replied 
that she was just trying to work it out, and did not mention a specific approach (e.g. applying 
Bayes’ Theorem). These two (high scoring) individuals are reasoning unusually cautiously, but 
the number of beads they draw (lower than average) does not reflect this. It is unclear whether 
their reasoning style should be regarded as optimal (it is, after all, apparently informed by an 
arithmetic approach) or obsessive and inefficient. Interpreted within the theoretical framework of 
the two factor model, these participants’ behaviors on the beads task could be taken as indicative 
of an exceptionally careful approach to reality testing. Such care could keep in check their 
unusually high level of distressing attenuated psychotic experiences. Their cautious precision 
may represent a coping style in the face of anomalous experiences, but this is not reflected in the 
sheer number of beads they drew.  
Other participant behaviors also suggested the need for caution in interpreting the results 
of the beads task. One participant (“high”; endorsing nine DAPPS) may have misunderstood the 
task, drawing the maximum amount of beads (20) on the 85:15 ratio. When queried about her 
approach, she reported that she had been trying to wait until fifteen of one color had appeared 
and beads of that kind stopped being drawn, at which point she could have been sure the jar was 
mainly the other color. This approach seems to eschew the purely subjective feeling of certainty 
that beads task participants are theoretically proposed to rely on, and might be viewed as a highly 
cautious but hopelessly inefficient strategy. She drew 19 beads on the 60:40 version, and seemed 
                                                            
6 This verbal response also reveals the subjectivity of the instruction prompt. It is possible that this participant was 
distracted by a demand for certainty, which may have felt impossible to her, and could have influenced how she 
responded to the task.  
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to rely on a subjective sense of probability rather than using the elimination strategy from the 
85:15 version. With the 60:40 version, such a strategy would have required the viewing of 40 
beads. A “low” participant (two DAPPS) drew only one bead before deciding on the 60:40 
version (which she saw first) and then five on the 85:15 version. When asked about her approach 
she reported that she had “just had a feeling” on the 60:40 version that the beads were coming 
from the mainly blue jar, but in retrospect wished she had seen more. Such an individual might 
be said to be “jumping to conclusions,” but her behavior became paradoxically more 
conservative when presented with an easier version of the task. Her behavior on the 60:40 
version may have represented a fleeting experience of certainty that did not generalize to the 
other version, or it may have represented a failure to understand the task. These observations 
were made by chance, and were not the result of a systematic exploration of how people 
reasoned, but they nonetheless reveal a potential flaw in the assumptions that underlie the use of 




Appendix B: Results with alternative groupings 
 
In the following appendix, data are presented on the two alternative groupings discussed 
in the results section.  
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of low/high participants by alternate groupings: 
 Grouping 2 Grouping 3 Total 
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Table 2. Average Distressing Attenuated Positive Psychotic Symptoms in low/high by alternate 
groupings: 
 Grouping 2 (PQ status at 
experiment) 
 (n=57) 
Grouping 3 (Stable 
PQ status) (n=48) 














43 (22.2) 12.58 
(3.9) 
B.1. Reaction times broken down by block and low/high classification, for each of the three 
groupings: 
In the following series of tables, descriptive SAT data is provided, broken down into 
low/high group comparisons. The data is provided separately for each of the two alternate sets of 
low/high groupings. For each grouping, three tables are included. In the first table, Mean and SD 
reaction time data are provided for the low and the high group in Block 1, Block 2 and overall.  
In the second table, these data are further broken down by the different types of stimulus 
that participants responded to. Low and high validity stimuli refer to whether the stimuli were 
predictive of a reward or not (i.e. “high validity” stimuli are predictive of a reward). Stimuli were 
colored either red or blue, and were either animals or household objects. Out of these four 
stimulus dimensions, one dimension (e.g. animals) would be rewarded; other stimuli (e.g. 
household objects) would not be. The “task irrelevant” dimension of the stimulus was that aspect 
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that was not predictive of the presence or absence of reward (in this example, color). The “task-
irrelevant” reaction times refer to the average reaction time to the different levels of the task 
irrelevant stimulus (RTs to red and blue objects). The terms “task irrelevant high” and “task 
irrelevant low” refer to whichever color participants responded more quickly to.  
In the third table estimates of salience attribution are extracted from the reaction time 
data as follows. Subtracting High Validity reaction times from Low Validity reaction times at the 
group level provides a measure of the extent of speeding to rewarded trials. Roiser et al. (2009) 
term this differential “adaptive salience”. It is implicit because it is derived from a behavioral 
measure. Subtracting reaction times to one form of task irrelevant stimulus (i.e. red animals on a 
trial when blue stimuli are being rewarded) from reaction times to the other form of task 
irrelevant stimulus yields a measure of aberrant salience. A totally rational participant in the SAT 
would not demonstrate speeding toward one or the other level of the task-irrelevant stimulus. An 
individual who assigns aberrant salience might be expected to show a pattern of speeding toward 







Table 3. Grouping 2 reaction time data by group and block 
 Low (n=25) High (n=18) 
Mean RT SD Mean RT SD 
Block 1 257.49 48.68 266.98 56.94 
Block 2 265.51 57.98 255.43 42.79 
Overall 261.50 51.92 261.20 48.99 
 
Table 4. Grouping 2 reaction time data by group, block and stimulus validity 
 Low (n=25) High (n=18) 
Mean RT SD Mean RT SD 
Block 1 High Validity 259.37 48.42 263.60 56.90 
Block 1 Low Validity 255.61 51.06 270.35 58.67 
Block 2 High Validity 262.71 56.82 251.95 42.29 
Block 2 Low Validity 268.32 64.19 258.91 45.56 
Block 1 Irrelevant High 262.71 56.82 280.23 64.82 
Block 1 Irrelevant Low 248.94 54.06 261.01 57.31 
Block 2 Irrelevant High 269.10 77.79 263.71 51.35 
Block 2 Irrelevant Low 262.68 57.49 261.31 52.31 
Overall High Validity 261.04 50.77 257.78 48.33 
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Overall Low Validity 261.97 54.90 264.63 51.02 
 
Table 5. Grouping 2 implicit salience data by group and block 
 Low (n=25) High (n=18) 
Block 1 Implicit Adaptive Salience (ms) -3.75 (20.61) 6.74 (19.82) 
 Implicit Aberrant Salience (ms) 15.65 (34.07) 6.41 (43.87) 
Block 2 Implicit Adaptive Salience (ms) 5.61 (35.37) 6.95 (20.16) 






Table 6. Grouping 3 reaction time data by group and block 
 Low (n=22) High (n=15) 
Mean RT SD Mean RT SD 
Block 1 251.30 48.64 253.96 41.92 
Block 2 258.61 56.84 249.07 36.76 
Overall 254.95 51.60 251.51 38.59 
 
Table 7. Grouping 3 reaction time data by group, block and stimulus validity 
 Low (n=22) High (n=15) 
Mean RT SD Mean RT SD 
Block 1 High Validity 253.28 48.44 250.7 43.36 
Block 1 Low Validity 249.32 51.10 257.22 43.09 
Block 2 High Validity 254.23 54.16 244.17 36.39 
Block 2 Low Validity 262.99 63.5 253.97 38.39 
Block 1 Irrelevant High 259.29 56.85 266.32 51.37 
Block 1 Irrelevant Low 241.69 52.92 250.04 41.44 
Block 2 Irrelevant High 260.51 75.46 256.54 38.21 
Block 2 Irrelevant Low 259.80 57.98 251.01 49.36 
Overall High Validity 253.75 49.63 247.43 40.64 





Table 8. Grouping 3 implicit salience data by group and block 
 Low (n=22) High (n=15) 
Block 1 Implicit Adaptive Salience (ms) -3.95 (21.26)  6.5 (21.08)  
 Implicit Aberrant Salience (ms) 17.60 (34.59)  16.27 (34.7) 
Block 2 Implicit Adaptive Salience (ms) 8.76 (31.74) 9.8 (19.86) 





B.2. SAT VAS Rating data:  
 
In addition to reacting with a key press across 128 trials, participants are asked, at the end 
of each block of 64 trials, to provide a subjective probability rating on a Visual Analogue Scale 
(VAS) of how often they were received money for different types of stimuli 
(red/blue/animal/household object). Average VAS ratings for each group are presented in the 
tables below.  
Grouping 2: 
Table 9. Grouping 2 VAS rating and explicit salience data by group, block and stimulus validity 
 Low (n=25) High (n=18) 
Block 1 VAS High Probability  62.40 (16.88) 68.89 (11.06) 
 VAS Low Probability  26.40 (16.81) 28.44 (22.137) 
 VAS irrelevant “high” 57.16 (14.12) 51.39 (11.40) 
 VAS irrelevant “low” 45.80 (16.75) 46.44 (15.05) 
 Explicit Adaptive Salience (%) 36 (28) 40.44 (28.76) 
 Explicit Aberrant Salience (%) 11.36 (18.76) 4.94 (24.62) 
Block 2 VAS High Probability  63.63 (18.05) 65.89 (14.01) 
 VAS Low Probability  33.64 (20.18) 40.06 (13.22) 
 VAS irrelevant “high” 38.96 (18.49) 37.11 (17.99) 
 VAS irrelevant “low” 49.24 (19.13) 62.72 (10.02) 
 Explicit Adaptive Salience (%) 30 (35.53) 25.83 (22.54) 





Grouping 3:  
Table 10. Grouping 3 VAS rating and explicit salience data by group, block and stimulus validity 
 Low (n=22) High (n=15) 
Block 1 VAS High Probability  60.59 (16.9) 69.2 (10.7) 
 VAS Low Probability  27.14 (17.57)  30.73 (23.6) 
 VAS irrelevant “high” 57.64 (14.85)  50.8 (12.06)  
 VAS irrelevant “low” 44.55 (16.97)  48.73 (14.84) 
 Explicit Adaptive Salience (%) 33.45 (28.61)  38.46 (30.34)  
 Explicit Aberrant Salience (%) 18.9 (11.94) 17 (17.97) 
Block 2 VAS High Probability  62.91 (18.78)  66.8 (14.63) 
 VAS Low Probability  33.41 (20.44)  40.87 (13.67) 
 VAS irrelevant “high” 51.18 (18.1)  62.93 (9.64) 
 VAS irrelevant “low” 37.7 (18.25)  38.2 (18.52) 
 Explicit Adaptive Salience (%) 29.5 (36.45)  25.93 (24) 





B.3. ANOVAs:  
 
Grouping 2 & 3: 
To explore differences between the task-irrelevant levels of the stimulus over time (i.e. 
changes in aberrant salience), reaction time data were entered into a mixed ANOVA model, with 
Block (1 vs. 2) and Mean RT to the two levels of the task-irrelevant stimulus (High vs, Low) as 





B.4. Self Report Aberrant Salience Data: 
56 participants completed the Aberrant Salience Inventory, data for three participants was 
incomplete or lost. Group means for the remaining 53 participants are presented in table 3., 
organized into the three different PQ groupings.  
Table 11: Self-Report Aberrant Salience Data by group: 
 Grouping 2: PQ 

























B.5. Probabilistic Reasoning Data: 
62 participants completed the probabilistic reasoning (beads) task. The outcome for this 
task was the number of beads drawn before participants felt certain they knew which jar the 
beads were coming from. Mean draws to decision for each group are presented in table 23. The 
distributions of these draws to decisions are presented in graphs 1 and 2.  
Table 12. Mean Draws to Decision (DTD) for “high” and “low” groups, across three 
groupings: 
  
Grouping 2: PQ 



































B.6. Group differences:  
To assess for DAPPS high vs low group differences on the test variables, multiple 
independent t-tests were conducted to compare group (high vs. low) means for VAS adaptive 
salience block 1, VAS adaptive salience block 2, VAS aberrant salience block 1, VAS aberrant 
salience block 2 the ASI, the 85:15 version of the beads task and the 60:40 version of the beads 
task.  A Bonferroni correction was applied for multiple (7) comparisons, so that the threshold for 
a significant finding was a p-value of 0.007. Results of multiple comparisons for Groupings two 
and three are shown in tables 13 and 14, below. 
Table 13-Grouping 2: Multiple t-tests of group mean differences on five test variables: 
Variable t-value p-value 
ASI Mean score 2.87 (df=41) 0.006* 
Beads (85:15) 0.52 (df=55) 0.60 
Beads (60:40) 1.84 (df=55) 0.40 
VAS adaptive Salience B1 0.50 (df=41) 0.61 
VAS aberrant Salience B1 0.22 (df=41) 0.82 
VAS adaptive Salience B2 0.43 (df=41) 0.66 
VAS aberrant Salience B2 1.31 (df=41) 0.19 




Table 14-Grouping 3: Multiple t-tests of group mean differences on five test variables: 
Variable t-value p-value 
ASI Mean score 4.83 (df=44) <0.001* 
Beads (85:15) 1.08 (df=46) 0.28 
Beads (60:40) 1.22 (df=46) 0.22 
VAS adaptive Salience B1 0.51 (df=35) 0.61 
VAS aberrant Salience B1 0.38 (df=35) 0.70 
VAS adaptive Salience B2 0.33 (df=35) 0.74 
VAS aberrant Salience B2 1.28 (df=35) 0.20 
*=significant at p=0.007. 
In both groupings, the only significant difference between groups was on mean total ASI 
score, suggesting that the groups here did not differ in terms of their draws to decision 




B.7.Logistic Regressions:  
To test for the possibility that probabilistic reasoning moderates the association between 
aberrant salience and DAPPS, logistic regression analyses were completed for Groupings two 
and three, using ASI aberrant salience and draws to decision for the two different versions of the 
beads task as predictors. Self-reported experiences of aberrant salience were associated with 
increased odds of belonging to the “high” DAPPS group, confirming the first hypothesis of the 
present study. Draws to decision was not reliably associated with increased odds of belonging to 
the high DAPPS group for either version of the beads task. To examine the interaction between 
aberrant salience and performance on the beads task, a third variable was computed to represent 
the multiplicative term of aberrant salience and draws to decision on the beads task. The 
interaction for both models was non-significant, suggesting that performance on the beads task 
does not moderate the relationship between aberrant salience and DAPPS.  
Table 16-Grouping 2 Logistic regression predicting High/Low DAPPS status using Aberrant 
Salience (ASI) and 85:15 Beads Task results: 
 OR 95% CI b (SE) P 
Aberrant Salience (ASI) 1.13 1.02-1.24 0.12 (0.5) 0.01* 
Beads 85:15 1.17 0.62-2.11 0.14 (1.6) 0.92 
 
Table 176-Grouping 2 Logistic regression predicting High/Low DAPPS status using Aberrant 
Salience (ASI) and 60:40 Beads Task results: 
 OR 95% CI b (SE) P 
Aberrant Salience (ASI) 1.123 1.02-1.23 0.17 (0.5) 0.01* 




Table 187-Grouping 3 Logistic regression predicting High/Low DAPPS status using Aberrant 
Salience (ASI) and 85:15 Beads Task results: 
 OR 95% CI b (SE) P 
Aberrant Salience (ASI) 1.21 1.06-1.38 0.19 (0.69) 0.05* 
Beads 85:15 1.09 0.18-65.04 0.09 (2.08) 0.96 
Table 198-Grouping 3 Logistic regression predicting High/Low DAPPS status using Aberrant 
Salience (ASI) and 60:40 Beads Task results: 
 OR 95% CI b (SE) P 
Aberrant Salience (ASI) 1.12 1.05-1.28 0.19 (0.69) <0.01* 





Appendix C: Prodromal Questionnaire (PQ): 
Indicate how often you have had the following thoughts, feelings and experiences on average, in the 
last month, by choosing the appropriate answer on the scale for each item. Do not include 
experiences while using alcohol, drugs or medications.  
For any item response greater than 0, please indicate if that experience has been distressing to you. 
Please answer all of the questions, and if you are unsure, choose the answer that you think is best.  
Indicate that you have read the above instructions: Yes or No	





i. Indicate that you have read the above instructions: Yes or No 
1. I have been distracted by noises or other people talking. 
2. The passage of time has felt unnaturally faster or slower than usual. 
3. I have had difficulty organizing my thoughts or finding the right words. 
4. When I looked at a person or at myself in a mirror, I have seen the face change right before 
my eyes. 
5. I have noticed strange feelings on or just beneath my skin, like bugs crawling. 
6. I have not gotten along well with people at school or at work. 
7. Previously familiar surroundings have seemed strange, confusing, threatening or unreal. 
8. I seemed to live through events exactly as they happened before (déjà vu). 
9. I have smelled or tasted things that other people didn't notice. 
10. I have had difficulty concentrating, listening or reading. 
11. I have had troubles at school or work. 
12. I have thought that other people could read my mind. 
13. I have heard things other people couldn't hear like voices of people whispering or talking. 
14. I have had difficulty expressing my feelings as well as I used to. 
15. I have had difficulty expressing my feelings as well as I used to. 
16. I have noticed a sense of not knowing who I am. 
17. I have noticed that I am less interested than I used to be in keeping clean or dressing well. 
18. I have heard unusual sounds like banging, clicking, hissing, clapping or ringing in my ears. 
19. I have mistaken shadows for people or noises for voices. 
20. Things have appeared different from the way they usually do (brighter or duller, larger or 
smaller, or changed in some other way). 
21. I have been very quiet and have kept in the background on social occasions. 
22. People have stared at me because of my odd appearance. 
23. I have wandered off the topic or rambled on too much when I was speaking. 
24. I have had experiences with telepathy, psychic forces, or fortune-telling. 
25. I have thought that other people had it in for me. 
26. My sense of smell has seemed unusually strong. 
27. I have felt that I was not in control of my own ideas or thoughts. 
28. I have felt unhappy or depressed. 
29. Everyday things have affected me more than they used to. 
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30. I have thought that I am very important or have abilities that are out of the ordinary. 
31. Other people have thought that I was a little strange. 
32. My thoughts have seemed to be broadcast out loud so that other people knew what I was 
thinking. 
33. I have had nothing to say or very little to say. 
34. I have felt unusually sensitive to noise. 
35. I have had superstitious thoughts. 
36. I have heard my own thoughts as if they were outside of my head. 
37. I have had trouble focusing on one thought at a time. 
38. I have felt that other people were watching me or talking about me. 
39. I have gotten very nervous when I had to make polite conversation. 
40. People have commented on my unusual mannerisms and habits. 
41. I have been less interested in school or work. 
42. I have found it hard to be emotionally close to other people. 
43. I have avoided social activities with other people. 
44. I have felt very guilty. 
45. I have thought that I am an odd, unusual person. 
46. I have thought that things I saw on the TV or read in the newspaper had a special meaning 
for me. 
47. My moods have been highly changeable and unstable. 
48. I have felt unable to enjoy things that I used to enjoy. 
49. My thinking has felt confused, muddled, or disturbed in some way. 
50. I have felt suddenly distracted by distant sounds that I am not normally aware of. 
51. I have been talking to myself. 
52. I have had the sense that some person or force was around me, even though I could not see 
anyone. 
53. I have been in danger of failing out of school, or of being fired from my job. 
54. I have engaged in some eccentric (odd) habits. 
55. I have been worried that something may be wrong with my mind. 
56. I have felt that I didn't exist, the world didn't exist, or that I was dead. 
57. I have been confused whether something I experienced was real or imaginary. 
58. People have found me to be aloof and distant. 
59. I have tended to keep my feelings to myself. 
60. I have experienced unusual bodily sensations such as tingling, pulling, pressure, aches, 
burning, cold, numbness, shooting pains, vibrations or electricity. 
61. I have thought about beliefs that other people would find unusual or bizarre. 
62. People have said that my ideas were strange or illogical. 
63. I have felt worthless. 
64. I have felt that parts of my body had changed in some way, or that parts of my body were 
working differently than before. 
65. My thoughts have been so strong that I could almost hear them. 
66. I have not been very good at returning social courtesies and gestures. 
67. I have seen special meanings in advertisements, shop windows, or in the way things were 
arranged around me. 
68. I have picked up hidden threats or put-downs from what people said or did. 
69. I have used words in unusual ways. 
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70. I have felt angry, easily irritated or offended. 
71. I have felt like I was looking at myself as in a movie, or that I was a spectator in my own life. 
72. I have been less able to do usual activities or tasks. 
73. I have not been sleeping well. 
74. I have felt that some person or force interfered with my thinking or put thoughts into my 
head. 
75. I have had experiences with the supernatural, astrology, seeing the future or UFOs. 
76. People have dropped hints about me or said things with a double meaning. 
77. I have been concerned that my closest friends and co-workers were not really loyal or 
trustworthy. 
78. I have had little interest in getting to know other people. 
79. I have seen unusual things like flashes, flames, blinding light or geometric figures. 
80. I have been extremely anxious when meeting people for the first time. 
81. I have felt like I was at a distance from myself, as if I were outside my own body or that a 
part of my body did not belong to me. 
82. I have found that when something sad happened, I was no longer able to feel sadness, or 
when something joyful happened, I could not feel happy. 
83. I have been crying. 
84. I have seen things that other people apparently couldn't see. 
85. I have felt unable to carry out everyday tasks because of fatigue or lack of motivation. 
86. Everyday things have been more stressful than before, like school or work, social situations, 
deadlines or changes in a schedule. 
87. I have avoided going to places where there were many people because I get anxious. 
88. I have felt more nervous or anxious, and have found it hard to relax. 
89. I have felt uninterested in the things I used to enjoy. 
90. People have found it hard to understand what I say. 
91. I have had trouble remembering things. 
92. People have said that I seemed 'spacey' or 'out of it.' 
93. I have felt like I had lost my sense of myself or felt disconnected from my life. 
94. I have felt afraid. 
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